Re: [Anima] Last Call: <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> (Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)) to Proposed Standard

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Sat, 08 June 2019 23:20 UTC

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To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
Cc: ibagdona@gmail.com, draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra@ietf.org, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, anima-chairs@ietf.org, tte+ietf@cs.fau.de, anima@ietf.org
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From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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Date: Sun, 09 Jun 2019 11:20:45 +1200
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Last Call: <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> (Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)) to Proposed Standard
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On 09-Jun-19 01:37, Eliot Lear wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 7 Jun 2019, at 23:17, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> wrote:
>>
>> Ok, now i got you (i hope ;-).
>>
>> I really liked the c1sco example (not sure if we should mention a real
>> company name in such an rfc someone not reading the draft might take
>> offense, maybe examp1e.com insted though).
> 
> This is a bit tricky with the glyph attack, but certainly the base should be
> example.com.

Can you use null.example.com and nu11.example.com?

    Brian

>> But taking your thought into account: There is a fundamental difference
>> betwen TOFU and out-of-band-authentication/approval (pick a term),
>> and the fact that different such mechanisms may have (often human)
>> weaknesses does not change this fundamental difference ??
> 
> 
> I think the key is that humans oughtn’t rely solely on a visual inspection of whatever is presented in front of them, but rather that they might rely on alternative inputs, such as recommendations made by the registrar provider, or federated services.
> 
> 
>>
>> Maybe you want to propose text ?
> 
> Manual approval by administrator or selection by administrator.
> 
> Eliot
>>
>> Cheers
>>   Toerless
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 01:09:09PM +0200, Eliot Lear wrote:
>>> Hi Toerless,
>>>
>>>> On 4 Jun 2019, at 21:28, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Thanks, Eliot,
>>>>
>>>> re-reading 10.3, my impression is:
>>>>
>>>> a) The use of TOFU in 10.3 seems to exceed the explanatory definition in 1.2.
>>>> The sentence stubs in 103 mentioning TOFU also don't seem to add value, the text
>>>> doesn't become IMHO worse if they are simply removed. And i am sure
>>>> there can easily be similar non-cyptographic leap of faiths in sales integration,
>>>> or consortium memberships trust chaing establishment.
>>>
>>> My point is that those are no longer leaps of faith.
>>>
>>> Eliot
>>>
>>>>
>>>> b) The text could IMHO be crisper:
>>>>
>>>> "will have no problem collaborating with it's MASA" ->
>>>> "will have no problem collaborating with it's malicious MASA" ->
>>>>
>>>> "the domain (registrar) still needs to trust the manufacturer" ->
>>>> "the domain (registrar) still needs to authenticate the MASA" ?
>>>> (i hope the latter is the correct interpretation of the text)
>>>>
>>>> Cheers
>>>>   Toerless
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 06:33:00PM +0200, Eliot Lear wrote:
>>>>> Just on this text:
>>>>>
>>>>> In Section 10.3 the following text exists:
>>>>>
>>>>>  o  A Trust-On-First-Use (TOFU) mechanism.  A human would be queried
>>>>>     upon seeing a manufacturer's trust anchor for the first time, and
>>>>>     then the trust anchor would be installed to the trusted store.
>>>>>     There are risks with this; even if the key to name is validated
>>>>>     using something like the WebPKI, there remains the possibility
>>>>>     that the name is a look alike: e.g, c1sco.com, ..
>>>>>
>>>>> First, this isn???t REALLY Trust-On-First-Use, and I would prefer that the term be replaced with something like "out-of-band approval".  This would also be a good area for certification services to step in to indicate the trustworthiness of a manufacturer.
>>>>>
>>>>> Eliot
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 21 May 2019, at 23:21, The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The IESG has received a request from the Autonomic Networking Integrated
>>>>>> Model and Approach WG (anima) to consider the following document: -
>>>>>> 'Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)'
>>>>>> <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> as Proposed Standard
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is a second Last Call. IoT Directorate review was done after the ANIMA
>>>>>> WG Last Call and consensus to request the publication, and that review resulted
>>>>>> in substantial changes to the document.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
>>>>>> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>>>>>> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-06-04. Exceptionally, comments may be
>>>>>> sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
>>>>>> the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Abstract
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic
>>>>>> Control Plane.  To do this a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI)
>>>>>> is created using manufacturer installed X.509 certificate, in
>>>>>> combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online
>>>>>> and offline.  Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable
>>>>>> address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity,
>>>>>> or on limited/disconnected networks.  Support for lower security
>>>>>> models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for
>>>>>> legacy reasons but not encouraged.  Bootstrapping is complete when
>>>>>> the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is
>>>>>> successfully deployed to the device but the established secure
>>>>>> connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the
>>>>>> device as well.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The file can be obtained via
>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> IESG discussion can be tracked via
>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra/ballot/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2816/
>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3233/
>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2463/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The document contains these normative downward references.
>>>>>> See RFC 3967 for additional information:
>>>>>>  rfc8368: Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) (Informational - IETF stream)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Anima mailing list
>>>>>> Anima@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Anima mailing list
>>>>> Anima@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ---
>>>> tte@cs.fau.de
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Anima mailing list
>>> Anima@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> ---
>> tte@cs.fau.de
> 
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