Re: [Anima] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-22: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 16 August 2019 17:40 UTC

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Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 12:39:57 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra@ietf.org, tte+ietf@cs.fau.de, anima-chairs@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, anima@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-22: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 12:17:22PM -0400, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>     doc> The MASA and the registrars SHOULD be prepared to support TLS client
>     doc> certificate authentication and/or HTTP Basic or Digest
>     doc> authentication as described in [RFC7030] for EST clients.  This
>     doc> connection MAY also have no client authentication at all (Section
>     doc> 7.4)
> 
>     >> > I don't see discussion of skipping client authentication in Section
>     >> 7.4.  > It would be great to have some, there!
> 
>     >> It's buried in point 2.
> 
>     > Oh, the "not verifying ownership" part?  I somehow was interpreting
>     > that as "we still require client authentication, but don't have a fancy
>     > database mapping owner to hardware, so any authenticated registrar can
>     > get a voucher for any device".
> 
> There are multiple models on how to operate a MASA.
> We think that which one is right depends a lot on the value of the device
> (in the ACP space, $100K routers vs $100 CPE devices), and also at the degree
> of sales channel integration.
> There is value in authenticating the Registrar, even if one does not know
> which device has been deployed.  In particular, this model supports the <4h
> SLA on service repair that most vendors have, and which they support by
> stocking spares in the local city, but not for a specific customer.

Understood.  To be clear, this was only ever intended to be an editorial
question (to be more explicit about not using client authentication), so
... use your editorial discretion.

-Ben