Re: [Anima] Last Call: <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> (Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)) to Proposed Standard

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Sat, 08 June 2019 13:37 UTC

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From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <20190607211720.y63ysayeqtkgi3lj@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
Date: Sat, 08 Jun 2019 15:37:16 +0200
Cc: ibagdona@gmail.com, draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra@ietf.org, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>, anima-chairs@ietf.org, tte+ietf@cs.fau.de, anima@ietf.org
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To: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Last Call: <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> (Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)) to Proposed Standard
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> On 7 Jun 2019, at 23:17, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> wrote:
> 
> Ok, now i got you (i hope ;-).
> 
> I really liked the c1sco example (not sure if we should mention a real
> company name in such an rfc someone not reading the draft might take
> offense, maybe examp1e.com insted though).

This is a bit tricky with the glyph attack, but certainly the base should be
example.com.


> 
> But taking your thought into account: There is a fundamental difference
> betwen TOFU and out-of-band-authentication/approval (pick a term),
> and the fact that different such mechanisms may have (often human)
> weaknesses does not change this fundamental difference ??


I think the key is that humans oughtn’t rely solely on a visual inspection of whatever is presented in front of them, but rather that they might rely on alternative inputs, such as recommendations made by the registrar provider, or federated services.


> 
> Maybe you want to propose text ?

Manual approval by administrator or selection by administrator.

Eliot
> 
> Cheers
>   Toerless
> 
> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 01:09:09PM +0200, Eliot Lear wrote:
>> Hi Toerless,
>> 
>>> On 4 Jun 2019, at 21:28, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Thanks, Eliot,
>>> 
>>> re-reading 10.3, my impression is:
>>> 
>>> a) The use of TOFU in 10.3 seems to exceed the explanatory definition in 1.2.
>>> The sentence stubs in 103 mentioning TOFU also don't seem to add value, the text
>>> doesn't become IMHO worse if they are simply removed. And i am sure
>>> there can easily be similar non-cyptographic leap of faiths in sales integration,
>>> or consortium memberships trust chaing establishment.
>> 
>> My point is that those are no longer leaps of faith.
>> 
>> Eliot
>> 
>>> 
>>> b) The text could IMHO be crisper:
>>> 
>>> "will have no problem collaborating with it's MASA" ->
>>> "will have no problem collaborating with it's malicious MASA" ->
>>> 
>>> "the domain (registrar) still needs to trust the manufacturer" ->
>>> "the domain (registrar) still needs to authenticate the MASA" ?
>>> (i hope the latter is the correct interpretation of the text)
>>> 
>>> Cheers
>>>   Toerless
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 06:33:00PM +0200, Eliot Lear wrote:
>>>> Just on this text:
>>>> 
>>>> In Section 10.3 the following text exists:
>>>> 
>>>>  o  A Trust-On-First-Use (TOFU) mechanism.  A human would be queried
>>>>     upon seeing a manufacturer's trust anchor for the first time, and
>>>>     then the trust anchor would be installed to the trusted store.
>>>>     There are risks with this; even if the key to name is validated
>>>>     using something like the WebPKI, there remains the possibility
>>>>     that the name is a look alike: e.g, c1sco.com, ..
>>>> 
>>>> First, this isn???t REALLY Trust-On-First-Use, and I would prefer that the term be replaced with something like "out-of-band approval".  This would also be a good area for certification services to step in to indicate the trustworthiness of a manufacturer.
>>>> 
>>>> Eliot
>>>> 
>>>>> On 21 May 2019, at 23:21, The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> The IESG has received a request from the Autonomic Networking Integrated
>>>>> Model and Approach WG (anima) to consider the following document: -
>>>>> 'Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)'
>>>>> <draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20.txt> as Proposed Standard
>>>>> 
>>>>> This is a second Last Call. IoT Directorate review was done after the ANIMA
>>>>> WG Last Call and consensus to request the publication, and that review resulted
>>>>> in substantial changes to the document.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
>>>>> comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>>>>> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-06-04. Exceptionally, comments may be
>>>>> sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
>>>>> the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Abstract
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic
>>>>> Control Plane.  To do this a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI)
>>>>> is created using manufacturer installed X.509 certificate, in
>>>>> combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online
>>>>> and offline.  Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable
>>>>> address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity,
>>>>> or on limited/disconnected networks.  Support for lower security
>>>>> models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for
>>>>> legacy reasons but not encouraged.  Bootstrapping is complete when
>>>>> the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is
>>>>> successfully deployed to the device but the established secure
>>>>> connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the
>>>>> device as well.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> The file can be obtained via
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra/
>>>>> 
>>>>> IESG discussion can be tracked via
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra/ballot/
>>>>> 
>>>>> The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2816/
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3233/
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2463/
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> The document contains these normative downward references.
>>>>> See RFC 3967 for additional information:
>>>>>  rfc8368: Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) (Informational - IETF stream)
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Anima mailing list
>>>>> Anima@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> ---
>>> tte@cs.fau.de
>> 
> 
> 
> 
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> 
> -- 
> ---
> tte@cs.fau.de