Re: [Anima] Adam Roach's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-22: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

"Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com> Mon, 15 July 2019 21:42 UTC

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To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
Cc: anima@ietf.org, Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
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Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 17:42:50 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Adam Roach's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-22: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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I would probably go a step further than Adam.  Protecting the device so 
a thief can not use it in the thiefs' own network seems to me to be 
something that we should not be trying to achieve.  An active non-goal. 
It is not our problem.  And trying to achieve it has the implications 
that lead to this whole discussion about the original manufacturer 
controlling who can resell / re-buy the device.  While manufacturers may 
like that, it does not seem to be something we should get involved in. 
At all.

Yours,
Joel

On 7/15/2019 5:10 PM, Adam Roach wrote:
> On 7/15/19 3:38 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>> On 15-Jul-19 16:45, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>> I presume I am missing something basic.
>>> I have tried to follow this discussion, as it seems to be about a
>>> critical aspect of whether the BRSKI work is acceptable.
>>>
>>> I have assumed that what we needed is the ability for a buyer, who has
>>> physical possession of the device, and possibly some simple (non
>>> cryptographic) credentials provided by the seller to force the device to
>>> reset what it thinks it is part of, and to emit in some accessible form
>>> the information the buyer needs to be able to make this device part of
>>> his network, using his authentication servers, etc.
>> Yes, but *not* a solution that works if the device is stolen.
> 
> 
> I'm actually a little ambivalent with respect to this use case. For the 
> kind of devices that the document purports to be targeting, I would 
> imagine that theft is in the range of parts-per-thousand (or lower) as 
> compared to things like post-bankruptcy liquidation. If you can fix the 
> first without ruining the second, great.
> 
> /a
>