Re: [apps-discuss] [http-auth] [websec] [saag] [kitten] HTTP authentication: the next generation

"Henry B. Hotz" <hotz@jpl.nasa.gov> Mon, 13 December 2010 22:59 UTC

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From: "Henry B. Hotz" <hotz@jpl.nasa.gov>
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To: Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
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Cc: "Common@core3.amsl.com" <Common@core3.amsl.com>, protocols <apps-discuss@ietf.org>, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>, websec <websec@ietf.org>, "General@core3.amsl.com" <General@core3.amsl.com>, Generation <kitten@ietf.org>, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, "http-auth@ietf.org" <http-auth@ietf.org>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org Group" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [apps-discuss] [http-auth] [websec] [saag] [kitten] HTTP authentication: the next generation
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On Dec 13, 2010, at 11:24 AM, Marsh Ray wrote:

> So IMHO, significant improvements in web authentication would be greatly 
> beneficial. But they will have to:
> 
> * Require connection integrity. This probably means mandatory TLS.
> 
> * Require a user interaction that takes place outside the insecure 
> browser rectangle and feels different enough that it's easy to explain 
> the difference.
> 
> * Not leak info to untrusted parties. These days privacy is often more 
> important than traditional security.
> 
> * Support browser vendors in making a UI that "sucks less" to have to 
> use, or possibly have to use it less. Put users in control of their 
> identity and auth credentials without nagging them repeatedly until they 
> give in and click the "Yes to all" button.
> 
> * Represent an actual improvement in security over the current standard 
> of HTML form POST password and secret HTTP session cookie.
> 
> - Marsh


+1
------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu