[aqm] Review of draft-ietf-aqm-codel-07
Yoav Nir <email@example.com> Tue, 21 March 2017 08:03 UTC
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From: Yoav Nir <firstname.lastname@example.org>
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Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 01:03:06 -0700
Subject: [aqm] Review of draft-ietf-aqm-codel-07
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Reviewer: Yoav Nir Review result: Has Nits Hi, I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The document describes the CoDel (controlled delay) framework for reducing bufferbloat. It does a good job of describing the problem, outlining the solution and providing both a description of the algorithm (including pseudo-code) and linking to real world implementations. Two nits: 1. A lot of terms are used long before they are explained, such as Estimator, Sojourn time, Interval (BTW: if this is a moving interval the spec should probably say so). When reading sections 3 I concluded that the document was aimed at peopel who already knew all these terms and didn't need definitions, but then reading section 5 gave me a lot of a-ha moments about what I had read previously. 2. The security considerations section says "There are no specific security exposures associated with CoDel." CoDel is about dropping packets, so immediately I have to think how I could subvert a router running CoDel to drop other people's packets. Perhaps it is fine to say that there are no known attacks on CoDel and no steps necessary to mitigate such, but I think it's tempting fate and hackers to say that CoDel has no security exposures.