Re: [arch-d] ETSI launches new group on Non-IP Networking addressing 5G new services

Brian E Carpenter <> Thu, 16 April 2020 21:17 UTC

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To: Toerless Eckert <>, John C Klensin <>
Cc: Christian Huitema <>,
References: <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <E029AEC023B1A60E3E956641@PSB> <>
From: Brian E Carpenter <>
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Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2020 09:17:05 +1200
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Subject: Re: [arch-d] ETSI launches new group on Non-IP Networking addressing 5G new services
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On 17-Apr-20 05:48, Toerless Eckert wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 02:56:30PM -0400, John C Klensin wrote:
>> It may also be worth noting that a, perhaps the, major add-on
>> change in IPv6 --much touted in its early days-- was supposed to
>> be ubiquitous lP-level encryption.

Not touted by the IPv6 protagonists, however. Yes, there was an intention
to make IPsec mandatory-to-implement, but there was never a claim from the
IETF that IPv6 with IPsec was intrinsically more secure than IPv4 with IPsec.

The claim that IPv6 was intrinsically secure was indeed touted; if I'm
not mistaken it orginated in an industry white paper, was picked up and
exagerrated by the IPv6 Forum, and got into draft-ietf-iab-case-for-ipv6-00,
(which led to draft-iab-case-for-ipv6-06 and was then scrapped). But it
also featured in various lists of IPv6 Myths over many years.


> Indeed. It is almost puzzling to think that end-to-end
> encryption at IP(sec) level was presumed to be a good
> architectural choice. Besides the obvious beneeit of being
> agnostic to transport protocol choices but then failing on
> ever getting a host stack model that would allow applications
> to leverage it easily. Of couse, luckily we have it (IPsec)
> as there are a lot of other good use cases for it.
> Maybe a bit too much of the "one size fits all" syndrom that
> new technologies by sheer self interest always come to presume ?
>>  That post-2013 encryption
>> deployment, at least AFAICT, relies on methods much closer to
>> the applications layer, sometimes ones that are at least
>> partially specific to particular applications and applications
>> protocols.  If there is a message in those things, I think it is
>> either that we are not good at predicting which of our
>> innovations will be successful and which will not or that, when
>> the IETF says "go forth and do X", thee are no guarantees that
>> the world will listen.
> Well, i think IPsec was an example of things working well in IETF.
> They may have overexpected on the range of where it best
> fits (and can be completed by host stack/APIs, which always is
> the worst dependency of any IETF work), but they (IPsec) folks
> AFAIK never tried to stop TLS with arguments like "we must only
> have one protocol" or the like, one of the negative syndroms we
> have IMHO seen for othre protocols in the IETF. But nothing
> the IETF can really do. Just comes when its participants develop
> a particular protocol religion or know how their jobs may depend
> on a specific protocol.
>> And I expect it will be some years more before we actually know
>> whether our more recent push toward encryption has helped the
>> Internet and its users by increasing privacy or whether pushback
>> and reactions from the political and law enforcement sectors
>> ultimately result in fragmentation, large-scale interconnection
>> problems, and the either development of a lot of ad hoc
>> solutions or movement of work to other SDOs because the IETF was
>> too stuck on the importance of encryption no matter what.   I
>> don't predict that outcome and definitely don't wish for it, but
>> I think our architectural work would be improved by more
>> recognition of the possibility.
> If i limit your "encryption to "(TLS) end-to-end encryption", then
> i think there are already a lot of people that have opinions about
> the results even visible today.
> IMHO, TLS has two main neglected consequences: It has become the
> key component of a strategy for revenue supremacy from one part of
> the industry, and it has moved the bad behavior (perpass and its
> revenue tail) into a layer of the solution (application) where it
> is out of the control of the IETF. Or at least out of the scope
> of interest of the companies shaping the IETF standards in that
> space because they are the beneficiaries of this evolution.
> So, the next round of privacy discussion as we already see will
> mostly be happening outside the IETF. For better or worse.
> This is of course non-withstanding the basic necessities to use
> TLS and its benefits.
> Cheers
>     Toerless
>> best,
>>      john
>> _______________________________________________
>> Architecture-discuss mailing list