Re: [arch-d] [hrpc] New Version Notification for draft-iab-for-the-users-01.txt

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Fri, 13 December 2019 14:21 UTC

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Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2019 09:21:43 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
cc: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>, "hrpc@irtf.org" <hrpc@irtf.org>, architecture-discuss@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [arch-d] [hrpc] New Version Notification for draft-iab-for-the-users-01.txt
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On Fri, 13 Dec 2019, Eliot Lear wrote:

> It concerns me that Paul Wouters can take from this document that somehow enterprises do not address end user interests.

Your take on what I wrote seems misinterpreted.

IETF protocols deliver protections within their protocols for end users
(or: end to end communication). Whereas the enterprise tries to take
some of that away to provide its own set of protections for their
subset of users (called customers or employees). My point was that
while both the end-to-end and customer/employees targets are valid,
the latter should not come at the expense of the former. The latter
(presumbly) voluntarilly opt-in for the replacement of protection
mechanisms. Therefor, the end-to-end principle of all users should
never be compromised for the betterment of a subset of users.

> The example I always give is that of a business who has a regulatory requirement to
> avoid leaking PII.  There are all sorts of toolsets that MITM communications in order to protect the privacy of account holders.  I think it would be useful for the draft to address this example as a bit of
> a case study.  One can reasonably argue that an explicit proxy mechanism on at least one side of a communication provides for this, but it begins to encroach on the so-called “end-to-end” views (I put that
> in quotes because the end-to-end model is often misused in these sorts of discussions).

The problem I see here, is that this business has the tools to do what
it wants to its subset of worldwilde users of a protocol to do what it
deems is best. But it should still not be at the expense of global
endusers as a group. Do not weaken the protocol for this use case.

That is the core of the argument I see returning at IETF, from TLS 1.3
to DoH and in the past with weake or backdoored crypto desires. I
think this document does a good job ob describing what I tried
to summarize from my viewpoint above and in my previous email.

Paul