[Asrg] RISC is end to end (was Re: DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end)

Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> Tue, 09 June 2009 00:23 UTC

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Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2009 09:23:33 +0900
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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Cc: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, Anti-Spam Research Group - IRTF <asrg@irtf.org>, ietf@ietf.org
Subject: [Asrg] RISC is end to end (was Re: DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end)
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David Wilson wrote:

>>As you say "IN NETWORKING", I'm afraid you haven't read his original
>>paper "END-TO-END ARGUMENTS IN SYSTEM DESIGN", which is on "system
>>design" in general and not necessarily "in networking". For example,
>>in the original paper, RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) is
>>given as an example of end to end design.

> Er, no. The article states:

The paper states:

	any attempt by the computer designer to anticipate the
	client's requirements for an esoteric feature will
	probably miss the target slightly and the client will end
	up reimplementing that feature anyway

which is an end to end argument where communication is at high
level between computer designers and their clients.

> It is clear from both of these that the basic subject is data
> communication over a communication system.

That is true only with the widest meaning of "communication". However,
"IN NETWORKING" by Phillip has a lot narrow meaning and even the
original paper says:

	A version of the end-to-end argument in a non-communication
	application was developed in the 1950's by system analysts
	whose responsibility included reading and writing files on
	large numbers of magnetic tape reels.

> So, applying this to DNSSEC's PKI, this is clearly an application layer

If you want to draw some conclusion from the 2001 paper, quote
text from the paper. There is no point to reiterate it with
your subtly modified terminology only to give a subtly modified
impression on the content of the paper.

> The second article is a discussion about how the end-to-end design
> principle might need to be modified in the light of the realities of the
> modern Internet.

That is an explanation on the motivation to write the paper and
the conclusion of the paper is:

	We argue that the open, general nature of the Net, which
	derived from the end to end arguments, is a valuable
	characteristic that encourages innovation, and this
	flexibility should be preserved.

which means the end to end argument is not modified.

Instead, the paper, for example, says for regulations to be
realistic, they should follow the end to end principle.

						Masataka Ohta