Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end
Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com> Tue, 02 June 2009 14:11 UTC
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Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2009 09:09:13 -0500
From: Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>
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To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
References: <200905302032.n4UKVxaZ048822@givry.fdupont.fr> <4A21C0CB.8070409@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> <8EFB68EAE061884A8517F2A755E8B60A1EF83F8661@NA-EXMSG-W601.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com> <4A252B54.6020508@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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Cc: Christian Huitema <huitema@windows.microsoft.com>, Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>, Anti-Spam Research Group - IRTF <asrg@irtf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end
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Masataka Ohta wrote: > Christian Huitema wrote: > > >>>That is, security of DNSSEC involves third parties and is not end >>>to end. > > >>That is indeed correct. An attacker can build a fake hierarchy of >>"secure DNS" assertions and try to get it accepted. The attack can >>succeed with the complicity of one of the authorities in the >>hierarchy. It is a classic "attack by a trusted party". > > > Yes, the hierarchy has hops. > > For my domain: "necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp", hierarechy of zones > have hops of ".", "jp", "ac.jp", "titech.ac.jp" and > "hpcl.titech.ac.jp". The authority hops are IANA, JPNIC, my > university, and my lab. Though you may have direct relationship > with IANA, JPNIC is the third party for both you and me. > This is exactly like a chain of PKI CA's (replacing the path from bottom to top of zone hierarchy): For my [end-user administrative units], [chain of CA's] have hops of [CA run by IANA], [CA run by JPNIC], [CA run by my university], and [CA run by my lab]. I don't know what is meant by a direct relationship with IANA. > >>If an intermediate authority has >>been compromised, it can just as well insert a fake NS record -- >>that's not harder than a fake record signature. > > > So, with a compromised hop of an intermediate authority, record > signature on the faked next hop key can be generated. > Exactly the same with a compromised intermediate CA. > Then, with a private key corresponding to the faked next hop key, > record signature on the faked second next hop key can be generated. > Exactly the same with a private key corresponding to the next intermediate CA along the chain (i.e. the one certified by the compromised CA). > Then, with a private key corresponding to the faked second next > hop key, record signature on the faked third next hop key can be > generated. > Same thing. > Yes, security of DNSSEC is totally hop by hop. > Thus, you imply a definition of hop by hop along digital signature relationships. Indeed, DNSSEC security is limited to the weakest link along the chain from the bottom to the top of the DNS hierarchy. Nothing new there. I don't think any DNSSEC expert ever claimed differently. Regards, - Thierry Moreau > Masataka Ohta >
- [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication Mech… Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Dave CROCKER
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Steve Atkins
- [Asrg] 答复: DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Sean Shen
- Re: [Asrg] ´ð¸´: DNS-based Email Sender Authentic… grenville armitage
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] ´ð¸´: DNS-based Email Sender Authentic… Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … John Leslie
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Dave CROCKER
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … John Levine
- [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Email Se… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… SM
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Florian Weimer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS discrimination Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Michael Tüxen
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Bill Manning
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Florian Weimer
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Christian Huitema
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Richard Barnes
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Richard Barnes
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Mark Andrews
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Christian Huitema
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Doug Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Doug Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- [Asrg] RISC is end to end (was Re: DNSSEC is NOT … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely