Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end
Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> Mon, 08 June 2009 23:55 UTC
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Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2009 08:54:48 +0900
From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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To: David Wilson <David.Wilson@isode.com>
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Cc: Anti-Spam Research Group - IRTF <asrg@irtf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end
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David Wilson wrote: >>According to the terminology of David Clark, PKI including DNSSEC >>is not secure end to end. > DNSSEC provides two things. Firstly, it provides the means to digitally > sign RRsets. This provides data origin authentication and data > integrity. The provision is through hops of certificate authorities, which is what is discussed in latter paper of David Clark published in 2001. Read it. > As this operates at the DNS application layer, this is > clearly "end to end" within David Clark's terminology. It does not rely > on any security services in the lower communication layers (in the way > that, for instance, relying on TCP would). If you read the paper, you can find the lower layer of PKI consists of communication with or between certificate authorities. Compromising a certificate authority in the lower communication layer breaks the security of data origin authentication and data integrity. > This origin authentication and integrity is precisely what is required > to avoid the DNS cache poisoning which is the kind of vulnerability > which prompted this discussion. As has been discussed in the thread, DNSSEC is NOT a protection against cache poisoning, because caches poisoned with forged certificate breaks the security. > This aspect of DNSSEC does not require the use of any PKI. Read the 2001 paper on why PKI not end to end and why DNSSEC no exception. The paper explains why scale breaks the end to end property. > I get the impression from you that DNSSEC is to be disregarded because > it is not "end to end". Being "end to end" has practical advantages. See above on how useless DNSSEC is to avoid cache poisoning, which was the motivation to deploy it. Masataka Ohta
- [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication Mech… Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Dave CROCKER
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Steve Atkins
- [Asrg] 答复: DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Sean Shen
- Re: [Asrg] ´ð¸´: DNS-based Email Sender Authentic… grenville armitage
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] ´ð¸´: DNS-based Email Sender Authentic… Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … John Leslie
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Jose-Marcio Martins da Cruz
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Dave CROCKER
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … John Levine
- [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Email Se… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… SM
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Florian Weimer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] rDNS discrimination Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Michael Tüxen
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP (was: Re: DNS-based Emai… Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP David Conrad
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Bill Manning
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Florian Weimer
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Francis Dupont
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Christian Huitema
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Douglas Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNS-based Email Sender Authentication … Amir Herzberg
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Richard Barnes
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Richard Barnes
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Thierry Moreau
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Mark Andrews
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end (more … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Christian Huitema
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Doug Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Paul Wouters
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Doug Otis
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- [Asrg] RISC is end to end (was Re: DNSSEC is NOT … Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end David Wilson
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end Masataka Ohta
- Re: [Asrg] DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end der Mouse
- Re: [Asrg] DNS over SCTP Alessandro Vesely