RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework
Art Pollard <pollarda@lextek.com> Mon, 16 June 2003 02:31 UTC
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To: Asrg@ietf.org
From: Art Pollard <pollarda@lextek.com>
Subject: RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework
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Date: Sun, 15 Jun 2003 16:46:55 -0600
At 01:49 PM 6/15/2003 -0400, you wrote: >At 11:18 PM 6/14/2003 -0400, Eric D. Williams wrote: > >>On Monday, June 09, 2003 6:21 PM, Art Pollard [SMTP:pollarda@lextek.com] >>wrote: >>8<...>8 >> > ... The CR system would filter based in the digital signature rather >> > than the FROM address. >> >>A signature that signs what? or do you mean a 'hash' produced using a >>'senders' >>private key? > >I think he meant a digital certificate issued by a third-part certificate >authority, not a digital signature. Actually, I meant a digital signature. ;-) Given a digital signature, one can be assured that the person who the mail says wrote the message actually wrote the message. It will assist to prevent spoofing of the sender's information (such as when spammers search archives to figure out who knows who). I envision when the whitelisting of an individual happens, their public key would be kept on record. The public key could be given in the header of the message that passed the CR process. Then if a new message comes in, the public key (again in the header) would be looked up to see if it has been whitelisted. If it is not in the whitelist, a challenge would be sent. If it is in the whitelist, then the message would be checked to ensure that the key and the signature match. If it passes then the message goes to the user. If it does not pass, a challenge would be sent. So, in a sense, the whitelisting would be based on the public key -- not on the e-mail address or user name or something forgable. This avoids having a third party authority having to provide certificates for one person or another. People could generate their own key sets. And as long as they provided the same public/private keys to each account that they used then their previous whitelistings would go with them. You do not need somebody to provide a certificate since the odds of having two people having the same public/private key pair are minimal and if there were a collision, there isn't much that a spammer could do about it. And even if they could, it would only consist of spamming only a handful of people (like 1-100) -- not the millions that they are used to. It just wouldn't be worth their time and effort. I don't think that certificates through a third party that guarantee that someone is who they say they are are really worthwhile since all it takes is for someone dishonest to start handing out falsified certificates. Or if a centralized certificate authorities were used, they would have a hard time keeping up with applications. Instead, just let people generate their own public/private keys and don't pay attention to whether they are who they say they are as the CR system will weed out those who have malicious intent. -Art -- Art Pollard http://www.lextek.com/ Suppliers of High Performance Text Retrieval Engines. _______________________________________________ Asrg mailing list Asrg@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/asrg
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework John Fenley
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Eric Dean
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Eric Dean
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Peter Kay
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Vernon Schryver
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Eric Dean
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Vernon Schryver
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Peter Kay
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Vernon Schryver
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Dave Aronson
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Vernon Schryver
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Kee Hinckley
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Scott Nelson
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Peter Kay
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Peter Kay
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Scott Nelson
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Peter Kay
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Rob Cameron
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Peter Kay
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Art Pollard
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Peter Kay
- Re: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Eric D. Williams
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Art Pollard
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Art Pollard
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Eric D. Williams
- RE: [Asrg] C/R Interworking Framework Yakov Shafranovich