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Re: [Atlas] Request signing

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 22 January 2018 21:20 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 16:20:21 -0500
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To: Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com>
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Subject: Re: [Atlas] Request signing
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This was the primary goal of SHTTP.  See RFC 2660.  Of course, SHTTP never saw wide-spread deployment.

Russ


> On Jan 22, 2018, at 2:41 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com> wrote:
> 
> A problem that keeps coming up in HTTP is the ability to sign requests/responses. Some see this as additional security, but others see this as beneficial for after-the-fact verification (e.g auditing).
> 
> If ATLAS proposes to encapsulate HTTP to prevent interference by intermediaries than it likely would also solve problems that HTTP request signing proposals have not been able to overcome — the possibility that intermediaries may alter HTTP requests for good (or bad) reasons. 
> 
> Has this been discussed?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Phil
> 
> Oracle Corporation, Identity Cloud Services Architect
> @independentid
> www.independentid.com <http://www.independentid.com/>phil.hunt@oracle.com <mailto:phil.hunt@oracle.com>

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