Re: [Atlas] Application Transport LAyer Security (ATLAS) Charter Text

Hi Hannes:

> El 7 feb 2018, a las 12:19, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> escribió:
> 
> Hi Rafa,
>  
> [Rafa] Ok. But my question is: are we going to consider TLS record for application data protection?
> [Rafa] Since the TLS record is used for the handshake anyway, the (constrained) device, in case of the IoT, will have the record layer implemented. Why don’t  we can re-use it for the application data protection?
> 
> It might depend on the use case what approach is better.
> In DTLS-SRTP, for example, it was considered better to re-use SRTP instead of the DTLS record layer due to existing hardware. Another example: For EAP-TLS used in network access the TLS record layer is only used during the handshake between the EAP peer and the EAP server but for the link layer security a different security mechanism is used instead since the endpoints are different. 

[Rafa] I do not know the case of DTLS-SRTP but, in my opinion, the case of EAP-TLS is different since between TLS and the link layer you have EAP and the goal of the TLS is the authentication and key generation for EAP to generate the MSK and not for the link layer itself. In other words, the link layer is agnostic about the use of TLS or not. Moreover, in EAP tunneled methods you use TLS record to protect further information between EAP peer and EAP server not only the handshake.  

Best Regards.

>  
> Ciao
> Hannes
>  
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