Re: [AVTCORE] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-payload-rtp-jpegxs-15: (with COMMENT)

[Tim Bruylants <[e-mail]>]

Thank you for the review and feedback.

I have prepared a new draft document that addresses your comments.

> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------

> ** Section 4.1. Typo. s/preceeded/preceded/

Fixed.

> ** Section 10.  . Thanks for mentioning the possibility of a denial of service
> due computational complexity.   Please considering adding a comment about
> processing untrusted input (similar to the language in other RTP payload drafts
> like: draft-ietf-payload-vp9 and draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1).  Roughly:
>
> OLD
>    This payload format and the JPEG XS encoding do not exhibit any
>    substantial non-uniformity, ...
>
> NEW
>
> Implementations of this RTP payload format need to take appropriate security considerations into account.  It is important for the decoder to be robust
> against malicious or malformed payloads and     ensure that they do not cause
> the decoder to overrun its allocated memory or otherwise misbehave.  An overrun in allocated memory could lead to arbitrary code execution by an attacker.  The same applies to the > encoder, even though problems in encoders are typically rarer.
>
> This payload format and the JPEG XS encoding do not exhibit any substantial non-uniformity, ...

Indeed, this is very useful to explain. Somehow it seems so obvious that we did not think about writing it down. Thanks for the suggestion.