Re: [babel] Comments on the MAC authentication for Babel draft

To be slightly pedantic about the IETF process here
(chairs, please correct me if I'm wrong), it's not too late
to make editorial changes to the document. It is too
late to make big technical changes, as that would require
the relevant ADs to re-review the document, but as authors
you can feel free to clarify the wording. Another option is that
you'll be able to also change wording during AUTH48 (one
of the very last steps of the process where the authors go
back and forth with the RFC Editor to get all the editorial
details right). All that will be required is for the responsible
AD (in this case Martin Vigoureux) to review the AUTH48
changes and confirm that they are editorial. I would suggest
making small editorial changes now right before we send
this off to the RFC Editor.

David

On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 5:22 AM Antonin Décimo <antonin.decimo@gmail.com>
wrote:

> > > 1. Key length
> >
> > I disagree. Using 64 octets for SHA-256 gives no additional security.
> >
> >
> https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/34864/key-size-for-hmac-sha256
>
> Ok, thanks.
>
> > > 2. Digest length
> > when a key is configured in a router, it is configured together with
> > the associated algorithm. The algorithm implies a digest length.
>
> Ah, I see. This is just what I had missed.
>
>
> Thanks for reviewing my comments. I don’t see any bugs left in the
> draft. I’m sorry to see that it’s too late for clarifications.
>
> -- Antonin
>
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