Re: [babel] Comments on the MAC authentication for Babel draft

Hi David,

On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 2:09 PM David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> To be slightly pedantic about the IETF process here
> (chairs, please correct me if I'm wrong), it's not too late
> to make editorial changes to the document. It is too
> late to make big technical changes, as that would require
> the relevant ADs to re-review the document, but as authors
> you can feel free to clarify the wording.

It's just a little complicated to cover all the paths a draft can take
but at this point the draft has been through AD review, IETF Last
Call, Directorate Reviews, and IESG balloting. If significant
technical changes/extensions are made at this stage, it might require
sending the draft back to the WG to go through that process again.
However, the draft can simply be cloned under a new file name (like
draft-ietf-babel-hmacbis-00 or the like) and the changes made there.

Of course, if there is a fatal technical flaw, it is probably the
right thing to pull the draft back and have it go through the process
again. If it is a bad enough problem, it can even be pulled back from
the RFC Editor's queue or at any point until it is actually released
as an RFC. (After that, you have to do a new RFC to obsolete it.)

> Another option is that
> you'll be able to also change wording during AUTH48 (one
> of the very last steps of the process where the authors go
> back and forth with the RFC Editor to get all the editorial
> details right). All that will be required is for the responsible
> AD (in this case Martin Vigoureux) to review the AUTH48
> changes and confirm that they are editorial. I would suggest
> making small editorial changes now right before we send
> this off to the RFC Editor.

We can make small editorial/clarification changes at this point.

After the RFC Editor gets it, you don't have to wait for AUTH48. The
RFC Editor will send out editorial questions and suggestions to the
authors along with a request that they review the document and
editorial fixes can be resolved then.

Thanks,
Donald
=============================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 2386 Panoramic Circle, Apopka, FL 33896 USA
 d3e3e3@gmail.com

> David
>
> On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 5:22 AM Antonin Décimo <antonin.decimo@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > > 1. Key length
>> >
>> > I disagree. Using 64 octets for SHA-256 gives no additional security.
>> >
>> > https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/34864/key-size-for-hmac-sha256
>>
>> Ok, thanks.
>>
>> > > 2. Digest length
>> > when a key is configured in a router, it is configured together with
>> > the associated algorithm. The algorithm implies a digest length.
>>
>> Ah, I see. This is just what I had missed.
>>
>>
>> Thanks for reviewing my comments. I don’t see any bugs left in the
>> draft. I’m sorry to see that it’s too late for clarifications.
>>
>> -- Antonin
>>
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