[bess] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-bess-evpn-proxy-arp-nd-09

Russ Housley via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 08 December 2020 16:20 UTC

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From: Russ Housley via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 08:20:36 -0800
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/bess/AulX2Hh3Nej1PJKqsnmZHqCRTiA>
Subject: [bess] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-bess-evpn-proxy-arp-nd-09

Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review result: Has Issues

I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area
Directors.  Document authors, document editors, and WG chairs should
treat these comments just like any other IETF Last Call comments.

Document: draft-ietf-bess-evpn-proxy-arp-nd-09
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review Date: 2020-12-08
IETF LC End Date: 2020-12-15
IESG Telechat date: unknown

Summary: Has Issues


Major Concerns:  I worry about the reference to SEND (RFC 3971).  The
  SEND protocol only supports digital signatures using RSA with SHA-1.
  While this still might be adequate for the time scales associated 
  with ND, the 80-bit security offered by SHA-1 is not considered
  adequate for digital signatures in general.  Is the reference to
  SEND really needed in this document?


Minor Concerns:  None


Nits:  The Gen-ART review by me includes some editorial suggestions.

[bess] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-bess… Russ Housley via Datatracker
Re: [bess] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-… Rabadan, Jorge (Nokia - US/Mountain View)