[bess] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-bess-evpn-mh-pa-11

Yaron Sheffer via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Fri, 08 November 2024 20:06 UTC

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Subject: [bess] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-bess-evpn-mh-pa-11
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Reviewer: Yaron Sheffer
Review result: Ready

This is a new redundancy mode for the Ethernet VPN (EVPN) architecture.

The Security Considerations are mostly a reference to the EVPN security
considerations, as well as the document that defines BGP extensions for
MPLS-based EVPN. Malicious misconfiguration of the router can result in various
forms of denial of service. It seems to me that those are similar across the
different redundancy modes, and therefore the Security Considerations look fine.