[bess] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-bess-evpn-vpls-seamless-integ-05: (with COMMENT)

[Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>]

Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-bess-evpn-vpls-seamless-integ-05: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Please be consistent about (non-)hyphenation of "VPLS A-D".

Is "MP2P" really an intended acronym (vs., e.g., P2MP)?  It does not appear
in https://www.rfc-editor.org/materials/abbrev.expansion.txt and is not
defined, even though P2MP is, and MP2P is used some 8 times in the
document.

We probably need a definition and/or reference for "split-horizon".

Section 2

   6. The support of All-Active redundancy mode across both (PBB-)EVPN
   PEs and (PBB-)VPLS PEs is outside the scope of this document.

The claim (not quoted) of "seamless" integration seems to only hold if
All-Active redundancy mode is not in common use.  Is it?

Section 3.1

                                                          In this case,
   when a VPLS PE receives the EVPN IMET route, it MUST ignore it on the
   basis that it belongs to an unknown SAFI. [...]

Is this "MUST" a new requirement imposed by this document, or a restatement
of an existing requirement from elsewhere?

Section 3.2

Please expand FEC on first usage (or define it in the terminology section).

When we talk about "learned" C-MAC addresses from traffic on VPLS PWs and
injecting those MAC addresses into bridge tables, RIB/FIB tables, and
MAC-VRFs, are these learned C-MAC addresses coming from provider-owned
equipment or customer equipment?  Giving the customer the ability to inject
MAC addresses without verification would probably merit a closer look
(though I do note that the penultimate paragraph discusses the
non-propagation of the learned addresses over the control plane).

Section 3.4.2, 4.4.2

My understanding was that P2MP (PBB-)EVPN tunnels are a well-understood thing, in
which case I would expect to see something more like "this document does
not modify the operation of multicast P2MP EVPN tunnels" than "outside the
scope of this document".

Section 5

Does the extra state that (PBB-)EVPN PEs need to maintain (i.e., both the
normal EVPN state and PWs to the VPLS PEs) pose any risk of DoS due to
resource exhaustion?