Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 4582bis and 4583bis
"Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com> Wed, 26 March 2014 23:10 UTC
Return-Path: <eckelcu@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: bfcpbis@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: bfcpbis@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2D481A0401 for <bfcpbis@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 26 Mar 2014 16:10:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -9.51
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.51 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bmv6Mv7ygQfn for <bfcpbis@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 26 Mar 2014 16:10:46 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from alln-iport-3.cisco.com (alln-iport-3.cisco.com [173.37.142.90]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAF041A0205 for <bfcpbis@ietf.org>; Wed, 26 Mar 2014 16:10:45 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=@cisco.com; l=30025; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1395875444; x=1397085044; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version; bh=D6uROMbvK70QKJVmar7LRhFOF1V/aP7EhrR/YrSboXo=; b=VUs2MaFB956tS+mjORYOUxjucp3N1KUK3QIZlrcukU+mQAxKUpdqZrxI Xhp9ydkhSSRXAV8GufK7Y4+4foyYoDqv8fUCXUZZ4C/kJHUYiwyIg59Pe /f3/LQDUz86iAzGK5v1ftVkb1Wx0oU/fSNbXn0nWynJ6dbwpr1EIoVjNo k=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgsFAN1dM1OtJV2c/2dsb2JhbABZgkJEO1fCeoEbFnSCJQECBC1MEgEIEQMBAiEBBjkUCQoEDgUbh17RWBeOYBEGB4QyBJRhg2ySM4MugWkHOw
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos; i="4.97,738,1389744000"; d="scan'208,217"; a="30667415"
Received: from rcdn-core-5.cisco.com ([173.37.93.156]) by alln-iport-3.cisco.com with ESMTP; 26 Mar 2014 23:10:44 +0000
Received: from xhc-aln-x15.cisco.com (xhc-aln-x15.cisco.com [173.36.12.89]) by rcdn-core-5.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id s2QNAhve010409 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Wed, 26 Mar 2014 23:10:43 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x08.cisco.com ([169.254.3.148]) by xhc-aln-x15.cisco.com ([173.36.12.89]) with mapi id 14.03.0123.003; Wed, 26 Mar 2014 18:10:43 -0500
From: "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <eckelcu@cisco.com>
To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
Thread-Topic: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 4582bis and 4583bis
Thread-Index: AQHPSUic50RqEV5EM0G8qoAclTNxQg==
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 23:10:42 +0000
Message-ID: <CF589899.23B24%eckelcu@cisco.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.3.9.131030
x-originating-ip: [10.21.124.61]
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_CF58989923B24eckelcuciscocom_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/bfcpbis/OyCiKwICjDgaz1DwTQ-ibCyQRKo
Cc: "bfcpbis@ietf.org" <bfcpbis@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 4582bis and 4583bis
X-BeenThere: bfcpbis@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: BFCPBIS working group discussion list <bfcpbis.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/bfcpbis>, <mailto:bfcpbis-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/bfcpbis/>
List-Post: <mailto:bfcpbis@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:bfcpbis-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/bfcpbis>, <mailto:bfcpbis-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 23:10:54 -0000
Hi Christer, Thanks for your comments. The more I looked into them the more complex and tangled things became. Let me try to walk through the current state of affairs and then propose a potential solutions. RFC 4582 breaks connection establishment into two cases: 1. when SDP offer/answer IS NOT used 2. when SDP offer/answer IS used For (1), RFC 4582 points to RFC 5018. draft-ietf-bfcpbis-rfc4582bis-11 adds a reference to RFC 5239 for XCON. RFC 5018 deals with the connection establishment, reestablishment, and TLS usage. RFC 5239 points back to RFC 5018 for connection establishment. RFC 5018 does not deal with DTLS. Unless we restrict DTLS to cases in which SDP offer/answer is used, we need to update RFC 5018 to deal with DTLS. Someone please tell me otherwise. Section 6.2 of draft-ietf-bfcpbis-rfc4582bis-11 describes how to extend RFC 5018 when dealing with BFCP over UDP or DTLS. I think this should be relocated to an update to RFC 5018, and connection reestablishment should be described as well. For (2), RFC 4582 provides a teaser but points to RFC 4583 for the normative language. draft-ietf-bfcpbis-rfc4582bis-11 similarly points to draft-ietf-bfcpbis-rfc4583bis-09. Christer comments are in regard to inconsistencies here. I provided comments on those inline. From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com<mailto:christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>> Date: Tuesday, March 25, 2014 at 12:39 PM To: "bfcpbis@ietf.org<mailto:bfcpbis@ietf.org>" <bfcpbis@ietf.org<mailto:bfcpbis@ietf.org>> Subject: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 4582bis and 4583bis Hi, Section 7 in 4582bis, which says: “7. Lower-Layer Security BFCP relies on lower-layer security mechanisms to provide replay and integrity protection and confidentiality. BFCP floor control servers and clients (which include both floor participants and floor chairs) MUST support TLS for transport over TCP [6] and MUST support DTLS [7] for transport over UDP. Any BFCP entity MAY support other security mechanisms. BFCP entities MUST support, at a minimum, the TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ciphersuite [6]. Which party, the client or the floor control server, acts as the TLS/ DTLS server depends on how the underlying TLS/DTLS connection is established. For a TCP/TLS connection established using an SDP offer/answer exchange [9], the answerer (which may be the client or the floor control server) always acts as the TLS server. If the TCP connection is lost, the active endpoint, i.e., the current TLS client, is responsible for re-establishing the TCP connection. Unless a new TLS session is negotiated, subsequent SDP offers and answers will not impact the previously negotiated TLS roles. For a UDP/DTLS connection established using the an SDP offer/answer exchange, either party can be the DTLS server depending on the setup attributes exchanged; examples can be found in [23].” First, we already earlier discussed that the active TCP endpoint is responsible for re-establishing the TCP connection, and that will be corrected in the next version of the draft. Yes. However, we have discussed a similar topic in CLUE, and we were wondering whether it would be good that, whoever detects a connection failure, sends a new offer in order to re-establish the connection. It does not matter if both endpoints send an offer – the offer/answer race condition rules will take care of that. In CLUE, is this for a TCP/TLS connection, or for a DTLS connection? For DTLS, we specifically chose to alter the behavior, as described in section 9.1 of 4583bis: "Endpoints that use the offer/answer model to establish a DTLS association MUST support the 'setup' attribute, as defined in [7]. When DTLS is used with UDP, the 'setup' attribute indicates which of the endpoints (client or floor control server) initiates the DTLS association setup. The requirements for the offer/answer exchange specified in [13], Section 5 MUST be followed when using DTLS. Informational note: How to determine which endpoint to initiate the TLS/DTLS association depends on the selected underlying transport. It was decided to keep the original semantics in [15] for TCP to retain backwards compatibility. When using UDP, the procedure above was preferred since it adheres to [13] as used for DTLS-SRTP, it does not overload offer/answer semantics, and it works for offerless INVITE in scenarios with B2BUAs." Second, Section 8.1 in 4583bis says: “When the existing TCP connection is reset following the rules in [8], the client MUST generate an offer towards the floor control server in order to reestablish the connection. If a TCP connection cannot deliver a BFCP message and times out, the entity that attempted to send the message (i.e., the one that detected the TCP timeout) MUST generate an offer in order to reestablish the TCP connection.” I am not sure what is meant by “TCP connection is reset following the rules in [8]”. Which rules are you referring to? Reset means closed and reestablished. The word “reset” was used in RFC 4582 and reused in 4582bis. Perhaps we should change it closed and reestablished to avoid confusion? Then, the text says that the client always re-established the TCP connection. Is that aligned with the text in 4582bis, saying that the active party does the reestablishment? Is the client always active? I think it is a little confusing that both 4582bis and 4583bis defines SDP Offer/Answer procedures. Shouldn’t they only be in 4583bis? Yes, I think so. RFC 4582 mixed some SDP offer/answer text into its section on lower layer security, and 4582bis followed suit. It would be better to have all the details of connection establishment and reestablishment in when using SDP offer/answer in 4583bis. Third, the last paragraph, talking about UDP/DTLS, says that either party can be DTLS server depending on the setup attributes exchanged. But, nowhere is it described how the setup attribute is used to determine the DTLS server role :) I assume it is done in the same way as for TCP/TLS, but that is not written anywhere. The text I pasted from 4583bis above describes this. If we put all the connection management stuff in 4583bis instead of leaving it split across 4582bis and 4583bis, this should be clear. Cheers, Charles Regards, Christer
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Christer Holmberg
- [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 4582bi… Christer Holmberg
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Charles Eckel (eckelcu)
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Christer Holmberg
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Tom Kristensen
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Tom Kristensen
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Christer Holmberg
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Christer Holmberg
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Tom Kristensen
- Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS and UDP/DTLS comments on 45… Charles Eckel (eckelcu)