Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS: Who is TLS server when the connection goes down and is re-established?

[Christer Holmberg <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

>> Some initial text proposal:
>>
>> "If the TCP connection is lost, the "active" endpoint is responsible for re-establishing the TCP connection.
>>
>> Unless a new TLS session is negotiated, subsequent SDP Offers and Answers will not impact the previously negotiated TLS roles."
>
> Is the passive endpoint expected to listen for the connection attempt at all times, or when it has noticed that the old connection is lost, or only when 
> there has been a new O/A? (It is kind of a waste to maintain a listener when you have an active connection and aren't expecting more. 
> And it is asking for trouble, since you might get a new connection when you think the old one is still functional.)

If a TCP connection has been established, I think it is enough to listen for the connection when it has noticed that the old connection is lost. I assume both endpoints would detect that more or less at the same time, or?

If a TCP connection has NOT been established, one would listen only when there has been a O/A used to negotiate the TCP connection.

> I realize this is old stuff, but I'm surprised that it didn't follow comedia about all of this, including who is active.

I am not sure I understand. Comedia IS used to indicate who is active. However, comedia is NOT used to indicate who is TLS client/server.

Regards,

Christer




> -----Alkuperäinen viesti-----
> Lähettäjä: bfcpbis [mailto:[e-mail]] Puolesta Christer 
> Holmberg
> Lähetetty: 16. tammikuuta 2014 21:36
> Vastaanottaja: Tom Kristensen
> Kopio: [e-mail]
> Aihe: Re: [bfcpbis] TCP/TLS: Who is TLS server when the connection goes down and is re-established?
>
>
> Hi Tom,
>
>>> I realize the following comes late in the process, and I apologize 
>>> if it has been discussed, but it is related to something which just 
>>> has recently popped up in 3GPP, and it's not addressed in the draft.
>>
>> Not too late, since we are still not finished! Anyway, the TCP/TLS 
>> connection reuse is not altered while extending BFCP to support 
>> unreliable transport. Any fixes now must be backwards compatible in 
>> some way.
>>
>> That said and based on what I have seen from different vendors, most 
>> of them still use TCP (without TLS) :)
>>
>> So, at least if we are changing anything to solve these issues, we 
>> should add an informational note indicating this is a change where 
>> legacy, pure RFC 4582 implementations might differ in behaviour...
>
> I am not suggesting to change anything - I am suggesting to specify 
> something which is currently unspecified :)
>
>> By the way: How these issues was solved in 3GPP are along the lines of what you propose below?
>
> We have had some discussions in 3GPP, and there are some text suggestions for the upcoming meeting next week.
>
> However, the discussions so far have been mostly about Q2. Q1 came up on a mailing list just this week, and whill be discussed at the 3GPP meeting next week.
>
>>> Section 7 says the following:
>>>
>>> "For a TCP/TLS connection established using an SDP
>>>
>>> offer/answer exchange [7], the answerer (which may be the client or
>>>
>>> the floor control server) always acts as the TLS server."
>>>
>>> Q1:
>>>
>>> Assume the TCP/TLS connection, for whatever reason, goes down.
>>>
>>> Now, I assume that whoever endpoint is "active" will most likely try 
>>> to re-establish the TCP connection.
>>>
>>> But, if the "active" endpoint doesn't send an Offer (i.e. it simply 
>>> tries to re-establish the TCP connection based on the previously 
>>> negotiated SDP information), who will act as TLS server? There is no 
>>> Answerer.
>>>
>>> One alternative would be to mandate the sending of an Offer when the 
>>> TCP/TLS connection is re-established. Then it would be clear who is 
>>> Offerer, and who is Answerer.
>>>
>>> Another alternative would be to say that whoever was previously 
>>> Answerer will act as TLS server.
>>
>> I'm not too fond of yet another re-INVITE being mandated, so if we 
>> will fix this issue mandating the previous answerer to be the TLS 
>> server would be my preference.
>
> Assuming that, then my follow-up question is:
>
> When you say "previous answerer", do you refer to the answerer in the latest Offer/Answer transaction, OR the answerer in the last Offer/Answer transaction that established/re-established the TCP/TLS connection (those Offer/Answer transactions may, or may not, be the same).
>
>
>>> Q2:
>>>
>>> Assume there is an Offer/Answer transaction during the session. Now, 
>>> the TCP/TLS connection is not affected by that, but the TLS roles 
>>> may change (if whoever was Offerer in the previous O/A transaction is now Answerer).
>>>
>>> I think some wording would be needed about that also.
>>>
>>> One alternative is to say that the TLS roles may change, but that 
>>> doesn't affect the TCP/TLS connection.
>>
>> A healthy TCP/TLS connection shouldn't be affected at all, should it?
>
> Correct. The question is whether such Offer/Answer can affect the TCP/TLS roles - even if the TCP/TLS connection itself if not affected. That could have impact on the case in Q1, where the TCP/TLC connection goes down, and it needs to be determined who is TLS server.
>
>> However, any potential connection re-establishment will need to 
>> monitor who was the last answerer to do the TLS initiation correctly.
>>
>> Hopefully I did understand the issue here, and added my 2 zlotys or 
>> pence or whatever,
>
> I think you did understand the issue :)
>
> Regards,
>
> Christer
>
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