Re: BGP-4+

[Brad Smith <[e-mail]>]

> Permit me to observe here that when there is subverted speaker, change to BGP
> protocol spec isn't good enough to contain possible damage.

This is certainly the challenge; however, I think, if you take the
perspective of minimizing or eliminating what a speaker can say
about resources it doesn't have authority for, you can go a long
way toward containing damage.

> While this threat is not that unlikely and should not be ignored, my view on
> this is that the prevention should take the form of speaker/host hardening
> rather than modification of BGP transport.

Hardening involves procedures and people in addition to technology; what
you say implies imposing significant restrictions on who can operate a
BGP speaker to achieve any significant improvements in security.  Is this
realistic?

> I especially wonder about scalability aspect of such modifications, strictly
> from an operational perspective.

Absolutely.  This is the final measure... is the illness more painful
than the cure.  It is certainly going to be quite painful.

Brad