Re: BGP-4+

[Tony Li <[e-mail]>]

   > A comment and question.  TCP and similar peer-to-peer security does
   > not protect against a subverted speaker.  If an intruder is able to
   > break into a speaker, where it would get access to all TCP security
   > related keys, it would then be able to have it's way with the protocol
   > (e.g. fabricate, modify, and replay routing information).

   Permit me to observe here that when there is subverted speaker, change
   to BGP protocol spec isn't good enough to contain possible damage.

True.  In fact, Radia Perlman has looked at the subverted speaker problem
quite a bit.  It turns out that you basically need a link state protocol to
disseminate enough information to still have a functioning network.  And
the cost in redundancy and additional computation is non-trivial.  

It's a major architectural change, which I haven't seen any willingness to
pay for either in the enterprise market or in the Internet backbone.

Tony