Re: Autonomous System Sanity Protocol

[William Allen Simpson <[e-mail]>]

> From: Tony Li <[e-mail]>
> Date: 26 Apr 1997 18:54:18 -0700
> Exactly so.  What's truly needed is a delegation of authority to advertise
> prefixes.  We'd also need a means of verifying that authority.  What Radia
> describes is sufficient to guarantee that the path advertised matches
> reality, which is necessary if we're out to secure the protocol against
> liars and bad guys.
>
> However, if we assume that the basic protocol machinery is correct and are
> out to protect us against ourselves, the delegation problem is the correct
> one to solve.  Note that any practical solution probably requires some type
> of key management solution already deployed.  One then needs to be able to
> see a hierarchy of signed and trusted address space delegations.
>
I was with you right up to that last statement.

I posit that in protecting against "liars and bad guys", we also protect
"us against ourselves" by _ensuring_ that the basic machinery is correct.

I see no use at all for "signed and trusted address space delegations."

The delegation we need is from address space _TO_ AS (or router in the
AS, or confederation, or abstraction area, or what-have-you).  That is a
delegation of "routing authority" rather than of prefix heirarchy.

My thought is that the current DNS Security model does not do this
cleanly, but I may be missing something.  Simple Public Key
Infrastructure (SPKI) has a delegation of authority model as its basis.

How hard would it be to map SPKI or SDSI delegations of routing
authority into DNS-Sec for the inverse address mapping?

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