IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [Captive-portals] A final check on draft-ietf-capport-architecture-09

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Mon, 10 August 2020 16:32 UTC

Return-Path: <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
X-Original-To: captive-portals@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: captive-portals@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDFA23A089B for <captive-portals@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 10 Aug 2020 09:32:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5u6HcmUqmndE for <captive-portals@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 10 Aug 2020 09:32:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [209.87.249.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E8B703A0898 for <captive-portals@ietf.org>; Mon, 10 Aug 2020 09:31:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5A2EA389DC; Mon, 10 Aug 2020 12:11:15 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with LMTP id 2_LVarwzBtJp; Mon, 10 Aug 2020 12:11:14 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from sandelman.ca (obiwan.sandelman.ca [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:2::247]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E398389DB; Mon, 10 Aug 2020 12:11:14 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 03133724; Mon, 10 Aug 2020 12:31:58 -0400 (EDT)
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
cc: captive-portals@ietf.org, Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
In-Reply-To: <3688bd80-1cd8-468c-bf5e-d5ee8731a1ab@www.fastmail.com>
References: <b666d3af-fcf6-4534-be01-7e7441d0d6d2@www.fastmail.com> <17263.1597033129@localhost> <3688bd80-1cd8-468c-bf5e-d5ee8731a1ab@www.fastmail.com>
X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6+git; nmh 1.7+dev; GNU Emacs 26.1
X-Face: $\n1pF)h^`}$H>Hk{L"x@)JS7<%Az}5RyS@k9X%29-lHB$Ti.V>2bi.~ehC0; <'$9xN5Ub# z!G,p`nR&p7Fz@^UXIn156S8.~^@MJ*mMsD7=QFeq%AL4m<nPbLgmtKK-5dC@#:k
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg="pgp-sha512"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 12:31:57 -0400
Message-ID: <30121.1597077117@localhost>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/captive-portals/I1n3Y51of_opiNmD5ynyRhaujT0>
Subject: Re: [Captive-portals] A final check on draft-ietf-capport-architecture-09
X-BeenThere: captive-portals@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of issues related to captive portals <captive-portals.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/captive-portals>, <mailto:captive-portals-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/captive-portals/>
List-Post: <mailto:captive-portals@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:captive-portals-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/captive-portals>, <mailto:captive-portals-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 16:32:02 -0000

Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:
    >> I'd rather we didn't allow for iPAddress SANs, but it's not a sword I'll die on.

    > Ack.  Personally, I'm more concerned about implementations allowing an
    > override option other than through modifying the trust store.  A domain
    > name is equally problematic there (let's hope we don't see .home
    > addresses...).  But I don't see any easy path to a per-host override
    > based on what I've seen in implementations so far.

Again, some enterprise PHB will point to this paragraph and tell the techie
that s/he doesn't need to do things the right way.  I've been there.
So I would like to know why we added it.  We can specify a subset of RFC6125.

    >> The next part says:
    >> An Enforcement Device SHOULD allow access to any
    >> services that User Equipment could need to contact to perform
    >> certificate validation, such as OCSP responders, CRLs, and NTP
    >> servers;
    >>
    >> That's a good list, and that list can be seen from looking at the
    >> certificates that the captive portal operator is going to use.
    >> But, aren't there *also* systems (Mozilla? Chrome?) where the respective
    >> vendors are collecting that info into a central place to make stuff go
    >> faster?   I can't quite find what I'm looking for in a search, because
    >> OCSP-Stapling is not what I'm talking about, and eliminates the need.

    > Yes, browsers are providing systems that help with revocation.  Mozilla
    > has OneCRL and CRLite; Chrome has CRLSets; offhand, I don't know what
    > Microsoft and Apple might be doing differently.  Those systems that I'm
    > aware of don't require network access at validation time.  The whole
    > point being to provide timely information about revocation without
    > depending on a live OCSP or CRL fetch (which have poor privacy
    > properties in addition to adding to fragility).

Ah, okay.  The CRL is "built-in", so it does not need to be fetched while in
captivity. Thank you.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email