Re: [Cellar] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1-16

[Jerome Martinez <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

On 23/07/2020 19:50, Michael Richardson wrote:
> Liang Xia via Datatracker <[e-mail]> wrote:
>      > But about my one question, I have not seen any response or actions: "Issues for
>      > clarification: In Security Considerations, besides the DoS attacks brought by
>      > the malicious payloads, is there any other kinds of attack possibly? For
>      > example, virus or worm are hidden in the malicious payloads to attack the
>      > system for more damages? Does it make sense and what's the consideration?"
>
> Hi, thank you for the review comments.
> Aside from possible buffer-overflow attacks that would attempt to smash the
> stack of a process, none of the content carried in ffv1 is intended to be executable.
>
> A virus or worm hidden in the payload would be rendered as if it was visual
> data by normal software processing.
>
> Clearly, a malicious system could use the ffv1 format in an attempt to disquise
> itself, but that would take a co-consipirator to extract that content.

I second Michael on the lack of attack implying hidden content, as the 
expected output is only visual content.

I added a pull request on the spec for adding an explicit mention of the 
lack of content intended to be executed at 
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFV1/pull/224 , in addition to fixes of issues 
found during last call review at https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFV1/pull/223

Jérôme