Re: [Cellar] New Version Notification - draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1-18.txt

[Spencer Dawkins at IETF <[e-mail]>]

Thanks, Roman and Dave!

Best,

Spencer

On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 4:01 PM Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Hi Dave!
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dave Rice <[e-mail]>
> > Sent: Tuesday, December 1, 2020 4:17 PM
> > To: Spencer Dawkins at IETF <[e-mail]>; Roman
> > Danyliw <[e-mail]>
> > Cc: [e-mail];
> [e-mail]; Codec
> > Encoding for LossLess Archiving and Realtime transmission <
> [e-mail]>;
> > Barry Leiba <[e-mail]>
> > Subject: Re: [Cellar] New Version Notification -
> draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1-18.txt
> >
> > Hi Roman, Spencer,
> >
> > > On Oct 30, 2020, at 1:41 PM, Dave Rice <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > >
> > > Thank you Roman,
> > >
> > >> On Oct 21, 2020, at 2:03 PM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF
> > <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Hi, Roman,
> > >>
> > >> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 12:38 PM Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]> wrote:
> > >> Hi!
> > >> (I can't find your response email to my ballot in my mail client
> despite it
> > being in the archive, so apologizes for making the new thread).
> > >>
> > >> Thanks for the -18 which cleared most of the COMMENTs.  I updated my
> > ballot.
> > >>
> > >> In the spirit of clearing what I consider a straightforward DISCUSS,
> might I
> > suggest:
> > >>
> > >> OLD
> > >>
> > >>   Implementations of the FFV1 codec need to take appropriate security
> > >>    considerations into account, as outlined in [RFC4732].  It is
> > >>    extremely important for the decoder to be robust against malicious
> > >>    payloads.  Malicious payloads MUST NOT cause the decoder to overrun
> > >>    its allocated memory or to take an excessive amount of resources to
> > >>    decode.  The same applies to the encoder, ...
> > >>
> > >> NEW
> > >>
> > >> Implementations of the FFV1 codec need to take appropriate security
> > considerations into account.  Those related to denial of service are
> outlined in
> > Section 2.1 of [RFC4732].  It is extremely important for the decoder to
> be
> > robust against malicious payloads.  Malicious payloads MUST NOT cause the
> > decoder to overrun its allocated memory or to take an excessive amount of
> > resources to decode.    An overrun in allocated memory could lead to
> arbitrary
> > code execution by an attacker.  The same applies to the encoder, ...
> > >
> > > The recommendation looks appropriate to me and more clear. I moved it
> to a
> > pull request at https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFV1/pull/253 for the
> consideration
> > of the other authors.
> >
> > Please note that we just updated the draft to include the recommended
> > changes for security considerations on denial of service, which can be
> reviewed
> > in version 19 of
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1/. Here’s a
> > link to the diff of version 18 and 19:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-
> > ietf-cellar-ffv1-18&url2=draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1-19&difftype=--html.
>
> Thanks for the update and pushing this text into -19.  I just cleared my
> discussion position.
>
> Regards,
> Roman
>