Re: [certid] open issue: wildcards in component fragments

Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net> Tue, 12 October 2010 13:02 UTC

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From: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2010 09:03:07 -0400
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Subject: Re: [certid] open issue: wildcards in component fragments
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On Mon, 2010-10-11 at 15:16 -0600, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> On 10/11/10 2:31 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
> > I strongly disagree. the -09 wording:
> > 
> >    The client MUST fail to match a presented identifier
> >    in which the wildcard character is contained within a label fragment
> >    (e.g., baz*.example.net is not allowed and MUST NOT be taken to match
> >    baz1.example.net and baz2.example.net)
> > 
> > attempts to invalidate rfc-2818 through the use of "MUST NOT".
> 
> The next version (-10) will make it abundantly clear that this I-D does
> not (and does not intend to) override, supersede, update, or obsolete
> the rules for verifying server identity provided in specifications for
> existing application protocols. On this point, Jeff and I have added an
> applicability statement to our working copy, which we hope to release in
> the next day or two once we've checked it against all the issues that
> were raised during IETF Last Call.

This seems possibly disingenuous to me.  The tls-server-id-check
document may not itself update RFC 2818, but do you really intend that
RFC 2818 never be updated in the future to use the tls-server-id-check
rules?  In view of the likelihood of such an update, it seems unhelpful
to claim now that compatibility with RFC 2818 isn't our problem.

-- 
Matt