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Re: [certid] Bad certificate handling

ArkanoiD <ark@eltex.net> Mon, 27 September 2010 13:53 UTC

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Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2010 17:54:19 +0400
From: ArkanoiD <ark@eltex.net>
To: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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Cc: certid@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [certid] Bad certificate handling
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I strongly agree and i address this problem in my software (and i guess so should everyone)

On Mon, Sep 27, 2010 at 03:48:26PM +0200, Martin Rex wrote:
> 
> Therefore having server-id-check unconditionally and silently override
> "pinned" server certs with server-certs that chain to one of the ~100
> trust anchors preconfigured by the software supplier is a significant
> security problem.
>

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