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Re: [certid] Please explicitly disallow unvetted info in subject names

"Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@ssc.lt> Thu, 10 June 2010 22:46 UTC

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References: <4C0E826B.3050904@bolyard.me> from "Nelson B Bolyard" at Jun 8, 10 10:48:27 am <201006101434.o5AEY4NX011362@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2010 01:46:30 +0300 (EEST)
From: "Moudrick M. Dadashov" <md@ssc.lt>
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Cc: certid@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [certid] Please explicitly disallow unvetted info in subject names
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> CAs vouch and are liable for every single bit in the ToBeSigned part
> of a certificate, no matter what stupid things they claim in any weird
> and ineffective "certificate practice statement" (CPS).
>
> A CA that doesn't is not a CA, but instead a hackers foot in your door.
>
> This applies equally to all components of the subject DName, and
> all X.509v3 extensions, such as all subjectAltNames, all keyUsages,
> all extendedKeyUsages, all BasicConstraints, AIA, CRL distribution points,
> and whatever else there is.
>

I agree with the list above except keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage which are
somewhat identity neutral.

> Blindly copying without validation any data from the PKCS#10 request
> into the certificate that they sign would be simply irresponsible and
> an act of gross negligence.

100% agree.

M.D.
cell: +370-699-26662
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> -Martin
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