[certid] Wildcards for serving untrusted web content / same origin policy

Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net> Fri, 17 September 2010 03:37 UTC

Return-Path: <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
X-Original-To: certid@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: certid@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 06FAF3A6BE0 for <certid@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 16 Sep 2010 20:37:40 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FxqR1bjFwhX3 for <certid@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 16 Sep 2010 20:37:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a2.g.dreamhost.com (caiajhbdcaib.dreamhost.com [208.97.132.81]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DE573A6BC5 for <certid@ietf.org>; Thu, 16 Sep 2010 20:37:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from homiemail-a2.g.dreamhost.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by homiemail-a2.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAFEB280063 for <certid@ietf.org>; Thu, 16 Sep 2010 20:37:32 -0700 (PDT)
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=mattmccutchen.net; h=subject:from :to:in-reply-to:references:content-type:date:message-id :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; q=dns; s= mattmccutchen.net; b=GdNlt2MW/gkNbrnjsPvZTzbPEZjeSbQCKyDZ2ur3muJ q/DpKkXWVyme9X49xwEPzLYpf9a4lw23BDdUS+RxqzhEEigZaNtj2UzQhLeVtZlZ xElmpkfpIlB6IAkTFoBw7UJkJd8XmI6GpE7ZqfUteD0ct6NAH38d5orYhLdnMY2A =
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=mattmccutchen.net; h= subject:from:to:in-reply-to:references:content-type:date :message-id:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; s= mattmccutchen.net; bh=8Lq9rQqvnSFFfznCoUF4O7oOQFE=; b=aAd+CFxcCm E0qRv9hCJJ42Wc1nrcrnXpZn1ZNhTGb9rKjmcZ1aNxs19DHgZ+iB962trLwgCYPH FeKLXx2Z13TdZCN+slHtaJj7UcGcDKIf7G6XH1r6QFdeSu83hfZ+oiKt8a8OSsEr StS14eQYV3Kb5nM8VsyMijvJnLeBbCND4=
Received: from [129.2.249.209] (ml2.student.umd.edu [129.2.249.209]) (Authenticated sender: matt@mattmccutchen.net) by homiemail-a2.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 8A027280062 for <certid@ietf.org>; Thu, 16 Sep 2010 20:37:32 -0700 (PDT)
From: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
To: certid@ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <5F42C835-3211-48A7-9375-CE45A9C53739@jpl.nasa.gov>
References: <201009160108.o8G18Sdm028897@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp> <5F42C835-3211-48A7-9375-CE45A9C53739@jpl.nasa.gov>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2010 23:37:31 -0400
Message-ID: <1284694651.5722.234.camel@mattlaptop2.local>
Mime-Version: 1.0
X-Mailer: Evolution 2.30.4
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: [certid] Wildcards for serving untrusted web content / same origin policy
X-BeenThere: certid@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Representation and verification of identity in certificates <certid.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/certid>, <mailto:certid-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/certid>
List-Post: <mailto:certid@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:certid-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/certid>, <mailto:certid-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2010 03:37:41 -0000

On Thu, 2010-09-16 at 09:55 -0700, Henry B. Hotz wrote:
> I believe wildcards are a misfeature [...]

One important use case for wildcards is a web server that serves
untrusted content spread out over a large or infinite set of subdomains
to get increased protection from the same origin policy implemented by
modern browsers.  The server may use one subdomain per user who
publishes content, or even a fresh subdomain for every request.  A
wildcard certificate is a much cleaner solution than having to automate
the generation of a certificate per user, let alone per request.

We can absolutely blame the inflexible same origin policy for
necessitating the use of different host names (which also breaks TLS
session sharing), but realistically it isn't changing any time soon.

(Pardon me if this has already been pointed out.)

-- 
Matt