Re: [certid] Last Call: draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check (Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity in Certificates Used with Transport Layer Security) to Proposed Standard

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Fri, 30 July 2010 16:24 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "certid@ietf.org" <certid@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2010 12:24:51 -0400
Thread-Topic: [certid] Last Call: draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check (Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity in Certificates Used with Transport Layer Security) to Proposed Standard
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Subject: Re: [certid] Last Call: draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check (Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity in Certificates Used with Transport Layer Security) to Proposed Standard
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Certs (and issues related to them) probably is the one area where there should be absolutely no difference between TLS and DTLS, rule-wise.
--
Regards,
Uri          uri@ll.mit.edu



On Jul 30, 2010, at 12:20 PM, Shumon Huque wrote:

> On Fri, Jul 30, 2010 at 07:49:51AM +0200, Peter Sylvester wrote:
>> 
>> You seems to say there that the text basically nails down to two
>> different id types, the dns based one (which is used in a very
>> prominent uri using application, i.e. https), and URI-id types.
> 
> Well that, and SRVName. There are many other custom types
> defined by specific applications but those aren't the focus
> of this document.
> 
>> It is a little bit difficult to have several certificates with
>> different URI ids sharing the same ipaddress+port.
> 
> I agree ..
> 
>> tls servername indication has not provision for this.
> 
> Yeah, it's too bad the current SNI spec only supports "hostnames".
> Maybe we should look into updating that to support alternative
> name forms.
> 
>> If one cannot have ids with different paths, what's the
>> beef having a path in an identifier?.
> 
> One can't have them in SNI extensions (actually they can't
> even have URIs at all, with or without paths). But if they
> appear in a URI SAN, what should be done, as a general rule?
> That was my question. If we're intending to only focus on
> authenticating an application server rather than a specific
> resource located at that server, then it would be simpler
> to declare this topic out of scope.
> 
>> What also seems missing is a paragraph on what
>> happens before the server presents its certificate, i.e.
>> what means does have the client to direct the server,
>> ip-address:port to connect and fqdn in the servername
>> indication at least.
>> 
>> ah, I forgot dtls?
> 
> I'm not sure that we have to deal with differences between 
> DTLS and TLS. The certificate identity matching rules 
> described in this document apply equally to both. The 
> connection establishment details differ, but that's currently
> not a subject of this document. Do you disagree?
> 
> -- 
> Shumon Huque
> University of Pennsylvania.
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