Re: [certid] open issue: wildcards in component fragments

Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im> Thu, 14 October 2010 21:57 UTC

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Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2010 15:59:14 -0600
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Subject: Re: [certid] open issue: wildcards in component fragments
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On 10/13/10 4:20 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
> Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>>
>> Jeff and I have been thinking about this independently today, and it
>> seems we're going in the same direction. Following Martin Rex's argument
>> to its logical conclusion has led me to believe that wildcards deserve
>> to be NOT RECOMMENDED in a best current practice document.
> 
> I'm certainly in favor of NOT RECOMMENDING the use of any wildcards
> to server admins (and to a lesser extent app protocol designers)
> in the security considerations section of the server-id-check
> document.
> 
> I'm less inclined about recommending to implementations to
> not implement it at all (which is about utility functions of the
> TLS implementation for use by the application).

After further reflection, I agree with you. I think Jeff is on board
with that, as well.

We should be able to publish -10 real soon now.

> Rather than leaving the issue of wildcards as underspecified as
> rfc-2818, I would appreciate a few words of what is commonly
> available in current web browsers and could be implemented with
> minor effort and low complexity.

Proposed text is always welcome.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/