Re: [certid] DC should be MUST NOT

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Wed, 30 June 2010 15:21 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: stpeter@stpeter.im (Peter Saint-Andre)
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 17:21:08 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <4C2A7062.2070207@stpeter.im> from "Peter Saint-Andre" at Jun 29, 10 04:14:58 pm
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Cc: certid@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [certid] DC should be MUST NOT
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Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> 
> In version -05 we had the following text:
> 
>    Domain Components (DCs) are unordered.  Therefore the following two
>    sets of DCs would be equivalent:
> 
>    dc=com, dc=example, dc=cn
> 
>    dc=cn, dc=example, dc=com
> 
>    Because com.example.cn is presumably different from cn.example.com,
>    representing or verifying an application server's DNS domain name
>    based on domain components would open a serious security hole.  As a
>    result, certificate issuers and application clients MUST NOT use DCs.

Slightly OT:
adding DC= AVAs to a DName would be fairly unreasonable if they did _not_
have a defined order.  I assume that the order is as much defined as it is
for the regular "hierarchical directory tree".

Although my PKIX & LDAP exposure is at the homeopathic level, I assume
the idea of the DC= components could be to establish something like
a hierarchical LDAP directory model based on DNS rather than assuming
a single global X.500 directory hierarchy and full-fledged DAP.


-Martin