Re: [certid] Please explicitly disallow unvetted info in subject names

[Martin Rex <[e-mail]>]

Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
> 
> There are a large number of CAs that follow the practice of vetting SOME
> of the information they put into cert subject names, but not all, and in
> fact deliberately making no attempt to vet certain attributes at all.
> 
> Examples known to me include:
> 
> OU names: typically not vetted at all
> 
> CNs other than the last (most specific) one, if it is a DNS name.
> 
> Maybe it's pointless to try, but can we write into this RFC that conforming
> certs contain NO unvetted attributes in the subject name nor in any Subject
> Alt Name attributes?
> 
> Since CAs seem to have such a strong desire to do so, maybe we should invent
> a new extension: unvetted subject alt names, where they can put whatever
> nonsense they want, and apps that care to use only vetted info
> can ignore.  It MUST NOT be a critical extension.  On the other hand, the
> correct processing of that extension should be defined to ignore it (:-)
> so that all apps may claim to properly handle it, even if it is critical.


This description of what some CAs are doing is completely bogus.

CAs vouch and are liable for every single bit in the ToBeSigned part
of a certificate, no matter what stupid things they claim in any weird
and ineffective "certificate practice statement" (CPS).

A CA that doesn't is not a CA, but instead a hackers foot in your door.

This applies equally to all components of the subject DName, and
all X.509v3 extensions, such as all subjectAltNames, all keyUsages,
all extendedKeyUsages, all BasicConstraints, AIA, CRL distribution points,
and whatever else there is.

Blindly copying without validation any data from the PKCS#10 request
into the certificate that they sign would be simply irresponsible and
an act of gross negligence.


-Martin