Re: [certid] Need to define "most specific RDN"

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Tue, 13 July 2010 16:32 UTC

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Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 09:32:06 -0700
To: Kaspar Brand <ietf-certid@velox.ch>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [certid] Need to define "most specific RDN"
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At 7:09 AM +0200 7/13/10, Kaspar Brand wrote:
>On 12.07.2010 19:22, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>> On 7/7/10 12:41 AM, Kaspar Brand wrote:
>>> Clarifying/fixing that blurry "(most specific)" statement from RFC 2818
>>> would be highly desirable for the new BCP, IMO. If by this we can get
>>> away with a term whose meaning isn't intuitively clear (compare this
>>> e.g. to "left-most DNS label"), then I would definitely consider that a
>>> plus.
>>
>> Would removing all mention of "(most specific)" qualify as clarification?
>
>-08 looks good to me, generally speaking, but in addition to the
>implementation note at the end of 2.2 I would add some wording to 4.4.4
>which states that a) if multiple CN-IDs are found in the subject, all of
>them should be checked

Wait, wait. The spec says in a few places that there must only be a single CN. If you add that (which was taken out of -08), you have to change all of them. I propose that we stay with the current MUST for a single CN.

> and b) this deliberately allows broader matching
>than the one originally "specified" in [HTTP-TLS] and [GIST].

Yes, saying that would be good.

>(Finally, let me add that browsers such as MSIE, Opera or Safari already
>implement this kind of multi-CN checking - if there is no subjectAltName
>extension, they will go through all CNs and look for a match [1]).

That doesn't make it a best current practice.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium