Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid?
Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im> Wed, 29 September 2010 20:02 UTC
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Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2010 14:03:20 -0600
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Cc: Stefan Santesson <stefan@aaa-sec.com>,
IETF cert-based identity <certid@ietf.org>,
Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid?
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[trimming tls@ and ietf@ from cc list] On 9/23/10 11:43 AM, Henry B. Hotz wrote: > > On Sep 22, 2010, at 9:44 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote: > >> At 10:21 AM -0600 9/22/10, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: >>> On 9/14/10 12:51 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote: >>>> General: I would consider stating that server certificates >>>> according to this profile either MUST or SHOULD have the >>>> serverAuth EKU set since it is allways related to the use of >>>> TSL and server authentication. At least it MUST be set when >>>> allowing checks of the CN-ID (see 2.3 below). >>> >>> [..snip..] >> > >> What possible advantage is there to making certificates that do not >> have this flag set be excluded from the practices you are defining? >> That is, if a TLS client gets a certificate from a TLS server that >> the TLS server says is its authentication certificate, why should >> the client care whether or not that flag is set? That flag is an >> assertion from the CA, not from the server who is authenticating. > > > Does this point need discussion? Without checking, I suspect that > 5280 says you obey the EKU, period. OTOH I think Paul raises a valid > point. > > OTOH (again) one could argue that the EKU provides a way to prevent a > stolen cert/key issued to the machine for a different function from > being repurposed to support a fake server. (I'm not convinced this > is significant, but it's something.) > > Absent discussion and consensus, I vote for whatever 5280 says, which > I suppose is what the current silence on the topic equates to. This I-D shall never be taken to override anything in RFC 5280 or any other normatively-referenced specification on which it depends. If folks think we need a blanket statement to that effect, please let us know. Version -10 will have a new section containing an applicability statement, which starts as follows: This document does not supersede the rules for certificate validation provided in [RFC5280]. But we can always add a stronger statement if need be. Peter -- Peter Saint-Andre https://stpeter.im/
- [certid] Fwd: Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serv… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… James Schaad
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Shumon Huque
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Shumon Huque
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Shumon Huque
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Shumon Huque
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Shumon Huque
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Richard L. Barnes
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Dave Cridland
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Martin Rex
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] [TLS] Review of draft-saintandre-tls… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Dave Cridland
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Dave Cridland
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Dave Cridland
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] [TLS] Review of draft-saintandre-tls… James Schaad
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Dave Cridland
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Shumon Huque
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Dave Cridland
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Review of draft-saintandre-tls-serve… Peter Saint-Andre
- [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] [TLS] Why require EKU for certid? Jim Schaad
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Martin Rex
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Henry B. Hotz
- [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Matt McCutchen
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Martin Rex
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Matt McCutchen
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Martin Rex
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Matt McCutchen
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints (oops) Matt McCutchen
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Matt McCutchen
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Jim Schaad
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Martin Rex
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Why require EKU for certid? Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Jim Schaad
- Re: [certid] CN-ID and name constraints Carl Wallace