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Re: [certid] section 4.6 rewrite (aka: Bad certificate handling)

Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net> Thu, 30 September 2010 01:10 UTC

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From: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
In-Reply-To: <4CA3C022.8050202@stpeter.im>
References: <4CA3AF50.6050101@KingsMountain.com> <006801cb6024$6049f5a0$20dde0e0$@augustcellars.com> <4CA3C022.8050202@stpeter.im>
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Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2010 21:10:48 -0400
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Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, 'IETF cert-based identity' <certid@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [certid] section 4.6 rewrite (aka: Bad certificate handling)
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On Wed, 2010-09-29 at 16:39 -0600, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> On 9/29/10 4:19 PM, Jim Schaad wrote:
> > There was one case in the original text here that I was expecting to be
> > kept.   This was the case of the chain of certificates being changed from
> > when it was originally presented.  Given the suggestion that the chain is
> > shown for advanced users (see 4.6.4) I am wondering about the fact that we
> > are no longer looking at anything more that the terminal certificate at this
> > point.
> 
> Yes, that's important.

What is the benefit of caching the entire certification path?  What
attacks does it prevent?  Mozilla PSM only caches the end-entity
certificate, and if there is a problem with that approach, I would like
to know about it.

-- 
Matt

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