Re: [certid] Domain Components

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Tue, 22 June 2010 21:31 UTC

Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: certid@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: certid@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 520DF28C108 for <certid@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 22 Jun 2010 14:31:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -7.701
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.701 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.166, BAYES_40=-0.185, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gieqzCsognCa for <certid@core3.amsl.com>; Tue, 22 Jun 2010 14:31:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CD3F28C10D for <certid@ietf.org>; Tue, 22 Jun 2010 14:31:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id o5MLVaEY017357 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 22 Jun 2010 23:31:36 +0200 (MEST)
From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201006222131.o5MLVZk9026823@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: michael@stroeder.com (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?=)
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2010 23:31:35 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <4C1FA6F0.1040001@stroeder.com> from "=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?=" at Jun 21, 10 07:52:48 pm
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Scanner: Virus Scanner virwal07
X-SAP: out
Cc: phoffman@imc.org, certid@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [certid] Domain Components
X-BeenThere: certid@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: Representation and verification of identity in certificates <certid.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/certid>, <mailto:certid-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/certid>
List-Post: <mailto:certid@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:certid-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/certid>, <mailto:certid-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2010 21:31:39 -0000

=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= wrote:
> 
> Paul Hoffman wrote:
> > At 4:42 PM +0200 6/19/10, Michael Ströder wrote:
> >> Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> >>> Paul Hoffman wrote:
> >>>> No, I'm saying that the order in which you are supposed to take the
> >>>> DCs has historically been unclear. "Most significant" means different
> >>>> things to different people.
> >>>>
> >>> I probably sound like a broken record, but the order is very clear for
> >>> LDAP. I don't see why is this going to be different for X.509 certificates.
> >>
> >> Yes, I concur RFC 2247 is pretty clear and is meant to be applied to X.500
> >> names as well.
> > 
> > ...and you think that all (or even typical) PKIX implementers read either
> > of those documents?
> 
> Some of them do.
> 
> If you dig in mailing list archives you will find that I know enough about
> deficiencies of real-world software. And I tracked down quite a few bugs in
> software of "major" PKI vendors some of them related to DN (string) handling.
> 
> But what does that tell us? To give up writing or referencing RFCs?

Since the document under discussion is supposed to become a
"Best current practice" document, I'm really wondering which of the
existing implementations actually implement server endpoint matching
based on DC components of a certificate subject name?

I would assume that matching to more than one CN= might be
more common than DC matching.

-Martin