Re: [certid] Comments on draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-04

Kaspar Brand <ietf-certid@velox.ch> Wed, 09 June 2010 07:12 UTC

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Date: Wed, 09 Jun 2010 09:11:56 +0200
From: Kaspar Brand <ietf-certid@velox.ch>
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Cc: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
Subject: Re: [certid] Comments on draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-04
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On 08.06.2010 20:50, =JeffH wrote:
> I personally seem to recall observing certs in the wild whose string-formatted 
> DNames included the "+" notation as Martin illustrates above, and which denotes 
> an RDN SET, although I don't recall whether such certs were produced by "real 
> CAs" as Nelson terms a certain subclass of CAs.
> 
> 
> Kaspar -- would information wrt multi-valued RDNames be embodied in the sample 
> you used to generate the above info you shared with the list?  If so, are there 
> any occurances, and if so what's the frequency?

There are 38 occurrences (out of ~90,000), originating from three "real
CAs". The vast majority (34) are EV SSL certs from a CA which apparently
likes to stuff the CN (2.5.4.3) and the serialNumber (2.5.4.5)
attributes into a single RDN. [Not so surprisingly, the remaining 4
certs were issued by two CAs which apparently run their infrastructure
with software from that other "real CA" - which is the reason for seeing
the same peculiar encoding in their certs.]

In the context of this BCP, I consider the discussion about
"multi-valued RDNs" an academic thing, mostly. I would not mind,
however, to change the last sentence in section 2.2, item 6 to something
like "Furthermore, the certificate's subject Distinguished Name SHOULD
NOT contain more than one Common Name attribute, and MUST NOT contain
RDNs which consist of multiple Common Name attributes" (provided that
this wording pleases the ASN.1 terminology experts in the audience here).

The definition of "CN-ID" in section 1.3 should probably also be adapted
(i.e., it should explicitly forbid multi-CN RDNs).

Kaspar