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Re: [certid] Comments on draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-03

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Wed, 12 May 2010 23:29 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: stpeter@stpeter.im (Peter Saint-Andre)
Date: Thu, 13 May 2010 01:29:19 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <4BEB2DC7.5020409@stpeter.im> from "Peter Saint-Andre" at May 12, 10 04:37:59 pm
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Cc: certid@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [certid] Comments on draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-03
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Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> 
> > So I'm not sure right now what to say about that. I suspect we can still
> > stipulate that the only RDN having attr type of CN that we'll pay
> > attention to is the one at the far end of the RDN sequence comprising
> > the DN.
> 
> We can stipulate that, but is it realistic?

An X.509 cert may contain several CN= components,
although this is much less common that multiple OU= components.

My own server endpoint identification code (including the original
string-representation-based) has always been checking all CN=
components of a DName and no matter where within the dinstinguished
name they are, but I noticed that Firefox and IE seem to check
only one of them.


-Martin

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