Re: [certid] CN fallback

Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@suse.de> Fri, 09 April 2010 12:44 UTC

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From: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@suse.de>
To: certid@ietf.org
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2010 14:43:51 +0200
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Subject: Re: [certid] CN fallback
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Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> On 3/23/10 8:44 AM, Ludwig Nussel wrote:
> > | If and only if the identity set does not include subjectAltName
> > | extensions of type dNSName, SRVName, uniformResourceIdentifier (or
> > | other application-specific subjectAltName extensions), the client MAY
> > | as a fallback check the value of the Common Name (CN)
> > 
> > What about rewording that to the following?
> > 
> > | If and only if the certificate does not include any subjectAltName
> > | extensions, the client MAY as a fallback check the value of the
> > | Common Name (CN)
> 
> I don't see a strong reason to change that text. This specification is
> about checking domain names, not IP addresses.
> 
> As an aside, I must say that I'm tempted to move everything about CNs to
> a separate section, or to remove it entirely, because I don't think it's
> a best current practice for secure authentication.
> 
> > That would avoid having generic implementations look into the CN as
> > fallback when it doesn't make sense. iPAddress for example isn't
> > specified by the I-D (why anyways?). 
> 
> 1. Do certification authorities issue certificates to IP addresses? The
> ones I work with don't (probably because they base their certification
> decision on control over the whois data or reserved email addresses for
> a domain name).

I don't know. Think of private CA's used internally by companies.
Software that implements the I-D isn't used exclusively on the
Internet after all.

> 2. If so, is that a best current practice for secure authentication? I
> don't think so.
> 
> 3. Users don't expect to connect to "192.0.2.7", they expect to connect
> to "example.com". That, at least, is one assumption of this I-D. You are
> free to write an I-D that specifies rules for representation and
> verification of IP addresses in certificates, but that's out of scope
> for this I-D.

The problem is that someone actually implementing the identity
checks for a program will come across iPAddress sooner or later.
Generic implementations like gnutls'
gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname() also have to deal with IP addresses
somehow.
That RFC you are drafting is such a wonderful chance to have this
clarified as well :-)

> > So a conforming implementation
> > could use the CN when looking for a hostname even if a
> > subjectAltName of type iPAddress is present.
> 
> Right. But I don't think that is consistent with your proposed text.

Confusing wording, sorry. The above cited sentence refers to the
current I-D. My proposal was meant to change that so a conforming
implentation must not fall back to CN checking if any subjectAltName
is present.

cu
Ludwig

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