Re: [certid] open issue: wildcards in component fragments

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Fri, 08 October 2010 00:45 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: stpeter@stpeter.im (Peter Saint-Andre)
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2010 02:45:40 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <4CAE3AFF.9020804@stpeter.im> from "Peter Saint-Andre" at Oct 7, 10 03:26:23 pm
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Cc: certid@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [certid] open issue: wildcards in component fragments
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Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> 
> On 10/7/10 3:12 PM, ArkanoiD wrote:
> > 
> > It was my primary concern too, i definitely prefer simple and
> > straightforward parsers that are less likely to behave any unexpected
> > way :-) Once we agree to implement complex parsing, someone almost
> > certainly will just use his favourite regexp library just because it
> > saves time (causing total havoc) ;-)
> 
> Exactly.

Full agreement.  

It is fine with me to cut sharp down to that functionality that
rfc-2818 described and illustrated 10 years ago. 

But I believe it is not appropriate to turn an rfc-2818 effective SHOULD
into a MUST NOT within a BCP unless there is a REALLY REALLY REALLY
good rationale for it.

I would be OK with deprecating it (SHOULD NOT).

Personally, I do not see any problems implementing exactly the
examples given in rfc-2818, but not more (i.e. single-wildcard
substring matching on the leftmost label only).

btw. "f*.com" is an rfc-2818 example that _my_ implementation of rfc-2818
matching unconditionally ignores when found in CN-ID or DNS-ID of a
server cert--I require at least 3 labels when a wildcard is used.
Should server-id-check promote "*.com" matching? (I think it should not).

-Martin