Re: [certid] Domain Components
Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr> Wed, 23 June 2010 04:52 UTC
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Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2010 06:52:19 +0200
From: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
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Subject: Re: [certid] Domain Components
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On 06/23/2010 03:02 AM, Martin Rex wrote: > =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Michael_Str=F6der?= wrote: > >> Michael Ströder wrote: >> >>> Paul Hoffman wrote: >>> >>>> It tells us that, when there are multiple ways to do things, and some of >>>> those ways are known to be insecure due to repeated poor implementations, >>>> we can say "don't do that" for the bad ways. >>>> >>> That's fine for me too. >>> >> But to make that more clear in this context: The draft should not discourage >> completely using DCs in the subject-DN. It should only recommend not to encode >> the server's hostname in the DCs. >> > Nope. It is important to strongly recommend to clients to _NOT_ > check the server endpoint identity based on DC components, that is > the important issue. There is no known sensible, consistent > and reasonably safe interpretation of DC name components > as the hostname for a server endpoint. > encoding and checking are two different things. There are two subchapters. It is not incoherent IMO to recommend encode a domain if and only if DCs are used at all, and "discourage" checking in all cases. > No implementation that doesn't have such code should add it, > At least 'No one is required neither must be forced to add.' is there any application that requires checking? > and existing implementations with such code should think about > removing it or disabling it by default. > Implementations don't think, well, hm, for implementors the situation might be less clear. Implementation details are out of scope anyway
- [certid] Domain Components Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Peter Sylvester
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Michael Ströder
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Peter Sylvester
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Michael Ströder
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Peter Sylvester
- [certid] CN-ID in version 6 Peter Sylvester
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Peter Sylvester
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Michael Ströder
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Paul Hoffman
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Peter Sylvester
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Michael Ströder
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Michael Ströder
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Bruno Harbulot
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Martin Rex
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Martin Rex
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Peter Sylvester
- Re: [certid] Domain Components Martin Rex