Re: [certid] open issue: wildcards in component fragments

Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> Tue, 12 October 2010 09:59 UTC

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Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2010 11:00:45 +0100
From: Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [certid] open issue: wildcards in component fragments
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On Mon, Oct 11, 2010 at 12:43:29PM -0600, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> Speaking of which, someone contacted Jeff and me off-list about some
> research results showing that of a very large number of certificates
> presented by TLS-protected websites, less than 0.01% contain wildcards
> in component fragments. Given that minuscule level of deployment, I
> don't see good reasons to spend more cycles on the topic.

The relative number of certs is less relevant than how widely those 
certs are used, surely.  I checked the "top 1m sites" database from:

http://blog.johnath.com/2009/01/21/ssl-information-wants-to-be-free/

- 382860 total sites (hostnames) returned a cert
- 94438 of total sites used a wildcard cert (24%)
- 5% of total sites use the wildcard cert with CN=*.blogger.com
   ... other blogging/mass-hosting sites similarly high usage

Only a handful (5) use the "f*.example.com" form; all those were certs 
issued by the GoDaddy and starfieldtech.com CAs.

I support Martin's arguments that the "f*.example.com" form specified in 
RFC 2818 should be supported.

Regards, Joe