Re: [Cfrg] Postquantum cryptography in IETF protocols

William Whyte <wwhyte@onboardsecurity.com> Tue, 14 March 2017 19:35 UTC

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From: William Whyte <wwhyte@onboardsecurity.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 15:34:56 -0400
Message-ID: <CAND9ES30xXz3zhGAsU4aED=fH0QWDD0TYc1QGM_n9a4fxCDt-g@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Tams, Benjamin" <Benjamin.Tams@secunet.com>
Cc: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Postquantum cryptography in IETF protocols
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I should note that Security Innovation, which owns the patents for NTRU and
which I work for, has announced an intent to make the NTRUEncrypt IP public
domain. A formal announcement should follow shortly.

Cheers,

William

On Tue, Mar 14, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Tams, Benjamin <Benjamin.Tams@secunet.com>
wrote:

> Hi John,
>
> > Good that CFRG starts some more detailed discussion on PQC. It makes
> sense
> > to support post-quantum key exchange for use cases that need long-term
> > confidentiality (15 years). For other use cases I think it can wait until
> > PQC key exchange algorithms has been thoroughly evaluated and
> > standardized. If implemented now, it should be used in addition to ECDHE,
> > just like Google has done with their experimental New Hope
> implementation.
>
> I absolutely agree with your view on the subject. Especially for those use
> cases where the attack scenario "collect today, decrypt tomorrow" is a
> threat,
> we should start thinking of PQ-safe key exchange methods in time. Even if
> they eventually turn out to be insecure; we can now combine them with
> classical key exchange algorithms. We have nothing to lose.
>
> There is already IETF work addressing PQ-security in Internet protocols,
> e.g.
> IKE and an Internet Draft for a Quantum-Safe Hybrid Ciphersuite for TLS
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-03
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-03
>
> On the other hand, there is (to my knowledge) no specification for a
> PQ-safe
> patent-free key exchange algorithm suitable for implementation. In fact, in
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-whyte-qsh-tls13-03
> only NTRUEncrypt is specified but is subject to patents.
>
> A possible first step is that CFRG creates an Internet Draft. In fact,
> the algorithm New Hope has already been implemented as a plugin for
> strongSwan (IPSec implementation for the Linux kernel)
>
> https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/tree/master/src/
> libstrongswan/plugins/newhope
>
> So why do we not start with a draft for which the above implementation can
> serve as a reference implementation?
>
> Kind regards,
> Benjamin
>
>
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