Re: [Cfrg] irsg review of draft-mcgrew-hash-sigs-12

For shore true, butt there’s always the Lord of the Rings risk: ”One ring to rule them all …”
__outer

> On 2018-09-05 (248), at 04:33:13, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, 5 Sep. 2018, 18:03 Stephen Farrell, <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie <mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>> wrote:
> 
> I disagree. We have seen cases (e.g. [1]) where CFRG RFCs
> leaving in options has lead to IETF WGs debating what to do,
> over and over. That seems to me to be CFRG's "fault" as it's
> predictable and could affect interop.
> 
> I agree with Stephen here. Though that part of the work might be more difficult, it is also the most valuable. Getting a tool with multiple knobs is not a net improvement over having no tool at all, and it can lead to interop failures.
> 
> Too many primitives we get are effectively unusable as a result of having options. The debate around ed25519 use for DKIM is a great example of that. RSA-PSS is another great example of a tool with too many independent inputs.
> 
> Those who find the one option too constraining can take on the extra costs of breaking new ground. Most should not have to.
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