[Cfrg] authenticated encryption with replay protection (AERO) - internet draft

David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> Fri, 03 January 2014 00:41 UTC

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Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 19:40:51 -0500
From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
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Cc: "John Foley \(foleyj\)" <foleyj@cisco.com>
Subject: [Cfrg] authenticated encryption with replay protection (AERO) - internet draft
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Hi CFRG,

I have a new proposal for authenticated encryption, which is 
particularly well suited for communication security.   An internet draft 
describing the idea has been published at 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mcgrew-aero-00 and I would like to 
request a slot at the upcoming CFRG meeting to present this work. (I am 
assuming that we will be meeting in London in March along with IETF 
89).   I alluded to this work on the thread about misuse resistant 
authenticated encryption earlier today.

 From the draft:

Authenticated Encryption with Replay prOtection (AERO)

    This document describes Authenticated Encryption with Replay
    prOtection (AERO), a cryptographic technique that provides all of the
    essential security services needed for communication security. AERO
    offers several advantages over other methods: it has more compact
    messages, provides stronger misuse resistance, avoids the need to
    manage implicit state, and is simpler to use.  This document defines
    a particular AERO algorithm as well as a registry for such
    algorithms.

Comments are welcome, and I especially encourage discussion about the 
appropriate goals for authenticated encryption.  The draft explains the 
rationale well enough, I believe, though it does not mention decryption 
misuse.   I will send a separate note on that topic.

A formal proof of security has not yet been published, but is believed 
to be possible, and the draft does include a security analysis.

Just for the sake of formality - in requesting this review and a slot at 
the upcoming meeting, I am acting as a CFRG member and not a chair.

David