Re: [Cfrg] 1024 bit RSA

Hanno Böck <> Sat, 05 November 2016 15:02 UTC

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Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2016 16:02:52 +0100
From: Hanno =?UTF-8?B?QsO2Y2s=?= <>
To: "Erik Andersen" <>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] 1024 bit RSA
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On Sat, 5 Nov 2016 14:35:07 +0100
"Erik Andersen" <> wrote:

> My best guess is that some vendor with a major voice in the standard
> organizations have products that due to a bad design cannot be easily
> upgraded to a stronger algorithm.

My guess as well. Something very similar happened in the TLS working
group. Some anonymous vendor let us know that we shouldn't enforce
RSA-PSS because they have a large deployment of devices not capable of
doing that. The working group fortunately didn't follow that request.

The very first thing I'd ask for here is transparency: What device,
which vendor, why was it shipped with substandard crypto?

> This proves to me that it wrong to leave the IT standardization to
> vendors.

Well, they should certainly take part in the discussion. But it's
important to communicate to them that:
a) if they ship substandard crypto it's their fault.
b) they should fix their development process to avoid that in the

Hanno Böck

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